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INTRODUCTION 
Fifteen years ago, Louisiana adopted a law mandating that “[a] person 
who is arrested for a felony sex offense or other specified offense . . . shall 
have a DNA sample drawn or taken at the same time he is fingerprinted 
pursuant to the booking procedure.”1  Today, at least twenty-eight states and 
the federal government have laws providing for DNA sampling before 
conviction (“DNA-BC”).2  Most other countries with DNA databases also 
collect samples on arrest.3 
These laws enjoyed a placid childhood, with surprisingly few 
constitutional challenges.  Those idyllic days are over.  After two federal 
courts of appeals cases upheld DNA-BC laws,4 two state supreme court 
opinions gutted similar ones.5  In response, the Chief Justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court promptly stayed the judgment of Maryland’s highest court, 
 
*  Distinguished Professor and Weiss Family Scholar, School of Law; Graduate Faculty 
Member, Forensic Science Program, The Pennsylvania State University.  I am grateful to 
David Blankfein-Tabachnick, Kit Kinports, and David Witherspoon for comments on a 
draft of this article and to David Housman, Robert Nussbaum, Kenneth Weiss, and Greg 
Wray for emails or conversations on the medical significance of the CODIS loci. 
 1 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:609(A)(1) (1998). 
 2 DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Dec. 7, 2012), 
http://nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/collection-from-arrestees.htm. 
 3 See, e.g., GENETIC SUSPECTS:  GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FORENSIC DNA PROFILING AND 
DATABASING 153–287 (Richard Hindmarsh & Barbara Prainsack eds., 2010) (discussing 
some international DNA collection procedures including procedures in Austria, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Australia). 
 4 Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 686 
F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 390 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012); United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1214 (9th 
Cir. 2010), vacated as moot en banc, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 5 Mario W. v. Kaipio, 281 P.3d 476, 483 (Ariz. 2012); King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 552–53 
(Md. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).  For a review of 
earlier cases, see Corey Preston, Note, Faulty Foundations:  How the False Analogy to Routine 
Fingerprinting Undermines the Argument for Arrestee DNA Sampling, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 475, 475–76 (2010).  A more complete list of the cases can be found at D.H. Kaye, The 
Constitutionality of DNA Collection Before Conviction:  An Updated Scorecard, FORENSIC SCI., 
STATISTICS & THE LAW (Mar. 30, 2013), http://for-sci-law-now.blogspot.com/2012/11/
the-constitionality-of-dna-collection.html [hereinafter Kaye, Scorecard]. 
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stating that “there is a fair prospect” that the full Court will follow the 
“considered analysis” of the courts that have upheld the practice.6  A writ of 
certiorari followed, and Maryland v. King is on the docket. 
This Article argues that whether it chooses to endorse, limit, or entirely 
disallow DNA-BC, the Court should reject the mode of analysis that all the 
lower courts have followed.  These courts have forsaken the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment in favor of a direct form of 
balancing.  This choice of doctrine has been made possible by the Supreme 
Court’s vacillation on whether and when the warrant requirement (subject 
to narrowly drawn, categorical exceptions) applies.  It is not too late to 
repair this fracture in Fourth Amendment doctrine.  This Article describes a 
more principled, “biometric exception” to the warrant requirement.7  This 
exception not only unifies the law on police acquisition of fingerprints, 
photographs, and, now, DNA profiles, but it also strikes a reasonable balance 
between individual interests in personal security and privacy and the 
government’s interests in personal identifiers that are valuable for law 
enforcement and other purposes. 
After arguing for this categorical mode of analysis, I suggest that the 
proposed exception to collecting and storing DNA profiles before 
conviction supports at least some forms of DNA-BC.  This conclusion is 
contestable, of course, but the analysis that leads to it generates a map of all 
the possible routes—and the obstacles along these routes—to a sound 
conclusion about the constitutionality of DNA sampling on arrest.  The 
voyage also takes us into a large and often dimly understood realm of Fourth 
Amendment law with its three related balancing tests—totality, special-
needs, and exception-defining balancing.  And, it takes us into the heart of 
the analogy drawn by many prosecutors and courts between DNA profiling 
and fingerprinting. 
The voyage proceeds in four stages.  Part I describes the two major law 
enforcement uses of biometric records, which I call authentication and 
intelligence.  Here, I argue that compulsory collection and recording of at 
least some of these identifiers during booking is justified to maintain a 
 
 6 Maryland v. King, 113 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2012) (order granting stay pending the disposition of 
the petition for a writ of certiorari). 
 7 For precursors of this proposal, see D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on 
Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455, 498–504 (2001) [hereinafter Kaye, Arrest]; D.H. 
Kaye, Who Needs Special Needs? On the Constitutionality of Collecting DNA and Other Biometric 
Data from Arrestees, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 188, 192–95 (2006) [hereinafter Kaye, Special 
Needs].  Although the state noted this possible exception in its Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 13 n.5, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-207), neither it nor 
the United States chose to rely on it.  Indeed, at oral argument the Deputy Solicitor 
General expressly disavowed “asking for a new exception.”  Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 26, King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (No. 12-207). 
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durable record of individual identity.  Part II examines opinions on the use 
of these records not merely for biometric authentication, but for trawling 
databases for matches to crime-scene DNA samples.  The rise of criminal 
intelligence databases has propelled some courts down different paths in a 
headlong rush that brings to mind Yogi Berra’s advice about what do when 
faced with a fork in the road—“Take it!”8  Parts II and III mark the locations 
of these forks and indicate why some of them should not be taken.  Part IV 
discusses the content of the balancing that ultimately must determine the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness of the criminal intelligence databases.  
It presents the case for a new exception to the warrant requirement and 
applies the exception to fingerprinting and DNA profiling.  It shows that the 
similarities between the two types of biological data are greater than is 
generally appreciated and suggests that the biometric exception permits at 
least some systems of acquisition and use of both fingerprints and DNA 
profiles for criminal intelligence databases. 
I.  THE TWO FUNCTIONS OF BIOMETRIC DATABASES 
A.  Authentication 
The Supreme Court has never explicitly approved of routine 
photographing, fingerprinting, or genotyping to establish and record the 
identities of prisoners.  For the better part of the last century, however, most 
lower courts have accepted the propriety of taking and maintaining 
collections of photographs and fingerprints on the ground that the impact 
on individual liberty, reputation, and property is minor in comparison with 
the value of establishing the true identity of an individual.9  These biometric 
records can serve many purposes.  By thwarting people from assuming false 
identities, they give jailers information about the dangerousness of the 
people they must confine; they supply prosecutors with information relevant 
to charging decisions and trial strategy; they facilitate prosecutions for the 
 
 8 YOGI BERRA, WHEN YOU COME TO A FORK IN THE ROAD, TAKE IT!:  INSPIRATION AND 
WISDOM FROM ONE OF BASEBALL’S GREATEST HEROES (2001). 
 9 See Kaye, Arrest, supra note 7, at 485–86 (discussing the “true identity” exception).  A 
leading case is United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932).  According to Wayne A. 
Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1580 (2012), judicial attitudes suddenly 
shifted in the 1930s from a general refusal to allow the acquisition and retention of 
photographs and other identifying information to “a less critical and more accepting 
view.”  My own review of the most significant appellate opinions from 19001932 
indicates that a majority of courts upheld the practices of the police in these matters, 
although the power to retain records after an acquittal was not clear even under Kelly.  
D.H. Kaye, The Judicial Reception of Acquiring Biometric Data on Arrest:  Photographing, Sizing, 
and Fingerprinting Before 1933, FORENSIC SCI., STATISTICS & THE LAW (Dec. 25, 2012), 
http://for-sci-law-now.blogspot.com/2012/12/the-judicial-reception-of-acquiring.html. 
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crime of escape, and they enable pretrial release and sentencing decisions to 
be based on an offender’s actual record.  In addition, they can assist in 
background checks of job applicants and in the identification of remains in 
mass disasters or more isolated cases of missing persons. 
Arguments against permanent records to authenticate claims of identity 
are weak.  To be sure, there is an American tradition that resists national 
identity cards, but fingerprints, visible bodily characteristics, and nucleotide 
base pairs are natural features whose production makes no significant 
demands on the individual.  Likewise, a claim of a right to effect a break in 
one’s social identity would be hard to maintain.  Knowing other people’s 
identities does not demean human dignity and worth, but rather is an 
important part of social interactions.  There may be something appealing 
about frontier days, when determined men and women could bury their past 
and prove their worth with an assumed name in a new land, but this option 
is mostly the subject of nostalgia and movie-making.10 
Because there is no right to a discontinuous identity, the case against 
persistent records of individual identity must rest on a claim that the 
acquisition, maintenance, or use of the records burdens some other rights 
or interests.  If the acquisition of a biometric identifier is minimally invasive 
and the only use of the records is establishing actual identity, however, such 
claims are implausible if not vacuous.  A database, used solely to discern a 
person’s true identity when the individual is legitimately in custody, should 
be acceptable under a simple, if previously unarticulated, exception to the 
usual Fourth Amendment requirement of a warrant based on probable 
cause.  It also can be justified under the more amorphous “special needs” or 
“administrative search” doctrine11 invoked by many courts to support post-
conviction DNA sampling.12  Before elaborating on the appropriate legal 
analysis, however, it is important to distinguish a second use of databases—
generating intelligence for criminal investigations.  This use implicates 
different individual interests and requires further justification. 
 
 10 D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases:  Legality, Legitimacy, and the 
Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413, 447 (2003) (discussing 
“[t]emporal anonymity”).  Cf. JOHN GRISHAM, THE PARTNER (1997) (depicting the travails 
of assuming a new identity).  Anonymity for specific purposes, such as making donations 
or whistleblowing, may have greater value. 
 11 See infra Part II. 
 12 E.g., United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2007) (following earlier cases that 
applied the special-needs test to uphold the constitutionality of DNA database laws); 
Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding a Wisconsin statute under 
the “special-needs” doctrine); State v. Martin, 955 A.2d 1144, 1150 (Vt. 2008) (discussing 
the “special-needs” doctrine and its use in previous cases). 
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B.  Intelligence 
A biometric database advances the objectives of the criminal justice 
system not only by enabling authentication of personal identity, but also by 
associating suspected or even unknown perpetrators to their crimes through 
physical traces such as fingerprints and DNA.  Although the latter use of 
fingerprint databases predates electronic computers,13 the FBI’s Integrated 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (“IAFIS”) contains digitalized 
images from over sixty-four million individuals.14  Parts of this database and 
various state fingerprint databases are routinely searched for criminal 
background checks and to yield short lists of possible matches to latent 
prints recovered from crime scenes.  A conservative estimate for the annual 
number of “hits” between crime scene prints and the prints in databases is 
50,000.15 
DNA profiles are more easily searched for unequivocal matches to crime 
scene samples.  By November 2012, the voracious national DNA database, 
fed by records from state and federal DNA typing laboratories, contained 
“over 10,043,800 offender profiles, 1,307,300 arrestee profiles and 461,900 
forensic profiles” and had “produced over 195,600 hits assisting in more 
than 187,700 investigations.”16  For both fingerprints and DNA, however, 
there are no statistics that show how much the database hits contributed to 
investigation or convictions,17 let alone the extent of their deterrent effect 
 
 13 Kenneth R. Moses et al., Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), in THE 
FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK 6-1, 6-4 (Alan McRoberts & Debbie McRoberts eds., 2011), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225320.pdf.  This history is discussed 
infra Part III.A. 
 14 Id. at 6-12. 
 15 The estimate is for 2005.  Id. at 6-11. 
 16 CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics (last 
updated Nov. 2012). 
 17 See JEREMIAH GOULKA ET AL., RAND CORP., CENTER ON QUALITY POLICING, TOWARD A 
COMPARISON OF DNA PROFILING AND DATABASES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 17 
(2010) (explaining that data on whether a hit resulted in an offender being apprehended 
and prosecuted would help improve the criminal justice system); Frederick R. Bieber, 
Turning Base Hits into Earned Runs:  Improving the Effectiveness of Forensic DNA Data Bank 
Programs, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 222, 227 (2006) (noting the lack of data on the outcomes 
of the “hits”).  But see H. Brevy Cannon, First Cost-Benefit Analysis of DNA Profiling Vindicates 
‘CSI’ Fans, UVA TODAY (Jan. 10, 2013), https://news.virginia.edu/content/first-cost-
benefit-analysis-dna-profiling-vindicates-csi-fans (“The first rigorous analysis of the crime-
fighting power of DNA profiling finds substantial evidence of its effectiveness.”); JOHN K. 
ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, THE DNA FIELD EXPERIMENT:  COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF DNA IN THE INVESTIGATION OF HIGH-VOLUME CRIMES 147 (2008) 
(“Property crime cases where DNA evidence is processed had twice as many suspects 
identified, twice as many suspects arrested, and more than twice as many cases accepted 
for prosecution as compared to traditional investigation; DNA was at least five times as 
likely to result in a suspect identification compared to fingerprints; [s]uspects identified 
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on future offenders or offenses.18  The lack of definitive data on the benefits 
of arrestee databasing makes it difficult to judge the extent to which early 
acquisition of DNA samples saves lives and prevents crime.  Although there 
have been many hits to arrestee DNA,19 we do not know how many of these 
arrestees later were convicted of a database-eligible crime anyway.  Neither 
do we know the impact of the delay in waiting for such convictions.  All we 
can say is that between arrests and trials, there will be some number of ar-
restees released pending trial who will commit additional crimes, and there 
will some cases in which evidence about other DNA-related crimes will be 
destroyed or lost. 
Unfortunately, in upholding convicted-offender DNA databases and, 
implicitly, fingerprint databases, several courts have elided authentication 
(true identity) and intelligence (identification of crime scene samples) uses 
of the databases by speaking of “identity” or “identification” in an 
undifferentiated sense.20  This confusion seems to have originated in Jones v. 
Murray,21 the first court of appeals case to uphold the constitutionality of a 
DNA database.  There, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that 
when a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his identification 
becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim 
privacy in it. . . . [T]he identification of suspects is relevant not only to 
solving the crime for which the suspect is arrested, but also for 
maintaining a permanent record to solve other past and future crimes.  
This becomes readily apparent when we consider the universal 
approbation of “booking” procedures that are followed for every suspect 
arrested for a felony, whether or not the proof of a particular suspect’s 
crime will involve the use of fingerprint identification.  Thus a tax evader 
is fingerprinted just the same as is a burglar. . . . As with fingerprinting, 
 
by DNA had at least twice as many prior felony arrests and convictions as those identified 
by traditional investigation.”). 
 18 Some indications of specific deterrence can be found in interviews with convicted 
offenders.  Barbara Prainsack, Partners in Crime:  The Use of Forensic DNA Technologies in 
Austria 153, in GENETIC SUSPECTS, supra note 3, at 16971.  An observational “multiple 
clock” study of Florida data attempted to separate the effect of specific deterrence from 
incapacitation.  The statistical analysis revealed only a small reduction in recidivism 
(within three years of release) for individuals convicted of certain crimes.  AVINASH 
BHATI, URBAN INSTITUTE, QUANTIFYING THE SPECIFIC DETERRENT EFFECTS OF DNA 
DATABASES 34 (2010), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=412058.  At best, 
however, this study measured only the marginal specific deterrent effect (after conviction 
and release) of being included in a database.  It did not address the deterrent effect on 
first-time arrestees. 
 19 For example, Virginia reports a total of 790 hits to the arrestee database from its 
establishment in 2003 through October 31, 2012.  Of these, 117 were associated with 
sexual assault cases.  DNA Databank Statistics, VA. DEP’T OF FORENSIC SCI., 
http://www.dfs.virginia.gov/statistics/index.cfm (last updated Nov. 30, 2012). 
 20 E.g., People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55, 65 (Cal. 2010) (“[I]ndividuals in lawful custody 
cannot claim privacy in their identification.”). 
 21 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992). 
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therefore, we find that the Fourth Amendment does not require an 
additional finding of individualized suspicion before blood can be taken 
from incarcerated felons for the purpose of identifying them.22 
The fallacy is that fingerprinting on arrest received “universal approbation” 
because it provided an excellent, permanent record of a person’s true 
identity—it was extremely valuable for authentication.23  Until relatively 
recently, an arrestee’s fingerprints were not generally “a permanent record 
to solve past and future crimes.”24  This separate intelligence function 
demanded huge computers and pattern-recognition software.  Because 
there is no single “purpose of identifying” arrestees, a more precise analysis 
is necessary.  Part II begins the task of describing the appropriate conceptual 
framework for assessing the constitutionality of “a permanent record” 
maintained either for authenticating an identity, for intelligence gathering, 
or for both purposes. 
II.  THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  Classifying and Balancing 
The Fourth Amendment protects personal security25 with two parallel 
clauses: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.26 
The first clause bars unreasonable searches and seizures; the second 
requires that warrants be based on probable cause.  But, the Amendment is 
 
 22 Id. at 30607. 
 23 See infra Part III.A (recounting this history). 
 24 A number of courts, however, approved of the acquisition or use of arrestee photographs 
in investigations and trials.  See Shaffer v. United States, 24 App. D.C. 417, 426 (D.C. Cir. 
1904) (rejecting as “fanciful” the defendant’s objection to the use of his arrest 
photograph, in which he had no beard, to help a witness identify him at trial, when he 
had a beard, on the ground that the state had no right to photograph him for that 
purpose); Mabry v. Kettering, 117 S.W. 746, 747 (Ark. 1909) (holding that men charged 
with state crimes and held in a county jail were not entitled to an injunction to prevent 
their jailers from giving their photographs to federal officials “for the purpose of 
identifying appellants in the various localities where [federal] offenses are charged to 
have been committed”). 
 25 Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008) (arguing that the core 
value of the Fourth Amendment is the interest in personal security rather than the 
privacy of information). 
 26 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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silent on how the two clauses interact,27 the historical record is “foggy,”28 and 
the scholarly literature is divided.29 
Opinions of the Supreme Court reflect this ambiguity.  At times, the 
Court has suggested that reasonableness can be determined by inquiring 
into the totality of the circumstances in each case.30  More often, however, 
the Court determines reasonableness by invoking a general and 
“prevailing”31 rule that searches require warrants,32 then looking through a 
pragmatic collection of categorical exceptions to this stringent demand.33  
 
 27 Competing theories are described in Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent:  John Adams, 
His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 1061 (2011) (rejecting the notion that 
the amendment was “designed solely to ban general warrants”) and Cynthia Lee, Package 
Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops:  What the Disappearing Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the 
Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1404 (2010) (arguing the 
tolerance of warrantless container searches demonstrates the “gradual embrace of the 
Separate Clauses or Reasonableness view of the Fourth Amendment”). 
 28 TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24 (1969). 
 29 See David H. Kaye, Drawing Lines:  Unrelated Probable Cause as a Prerequisite to Early DNA 
Collection, 91 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 1, 1516 nn.7172 (2012) [hereinafter Kaye, 
Drawing Lines] (citing some of the contentious writings). 
 30 E.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (“Courts must consider the scope of the 
particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, 
and the place in which it is conducted.”).  Cf. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 
299300 (1999) (“Where [historical] inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the 
search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one 
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the 
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”); 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 65253 (1995) (“At least . . . where there 
was no clear practice . . . at the time the constitutional provision was enacted, whether a 
particular search meets the reasonableness standard is judged by balancing its intrusion 
on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted)).  For a 
criticism of the theory of “constitutionalized common law,” see David A. Sklansky, The 
Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1808 (2000). 
 31 United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802 (1974). 
 32 E.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (“It is a basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law, we have often said, that searches and seizures inside a home without a 
warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); City of 
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (“[A]s a general matter, warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment . . . .” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (“[S]earches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions.” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
357 (1967))); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (“The Fourth Amendment 
proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that 
‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”). 
 33 On the development of this approach of classification rather than balancing, see, for 
example, Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away:  
The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
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For instance, in Cupp v. Murphy,34 the Court held that scraping material from 
under an arrestee’s fingernails without first securing a warrant was 
reasonable—but only because it fell into a previously accepted category of 
warrantless searches “incident to a valid arrest.”35  This incident-to-arrest 
exception is based on the premise that arresting officers often need to act 
quickly to preserve evidence or to protect themselves.36 
Categorical exceptions are the result of a prior balancing of such factors 
as the feasibility or value of securing a warrant, the extent and nature of the 
invasion of privacy, the purpose of the search, and the likelihood that it will 
achieve its goal.  But this pre-exception balancing occurs at the level of 
defining the rule rather than applying it to the facts of a specific case.  In 
other words, the creation of exceptions to the warrant requirement is a 
species of standards-based reasoning that entails the balancing of a defined 
range of competing considerations.37  Its purpose is to generate a framework 
of exceptions that do not permit direct appeals to the factors used to create 
the more specific rules. 
Constraining courts to a rule-based system can provide greater accuracy 
and predictability in judicial decisionmaking than that which would flow 
from direct balancing in every case.38  Of course, if all judges and lawyers 
were like Ronald Dworkin’s Judge Hercules,39 the rules for warrantless 
searches would be unnecessarily restrictive and unwise.  Direct appeals to 
reasonableness would resolve the cases correctly.  But, in the real world of 
 
CRIMINOLOGY 933 (2010).  Some of the ebb and flow, as it pertains to DNA database laws, 
is noted infra Part III. 
 34 412 U.S. 291 (1973). 
 35 Id. at 295. 
 36 Consequently, the exception does not justify DNA collection.  In Cupp, defendant had 
placed his hands behind his back, then into his pockets, and a metallic sound, such as 
keys or change rattling, was heard.  Id. at 296.  “The rationale of Chimel [v. California, 395 
U.S. 752 (1969)], in these circumstances, justified the police in subjecting him to the very 
limited search necessary to preserve the highly evanescent evidence they found under his 
fingernails.”  Cupp, 412 U.S. at 296.  Recognizing that “[t]he Court’s search incident to 
arrest cases have been bottomed on different justifications,” the Department of Justice 
did not take the position, suggested by Justice Kennedy in the oral argument in King, that 
Maryland (and federal) law merely was implementing “a search incident to an arrest” that 
was “just like taking the pockets out and—and seeing what’s in the person’s overcoat and 
so forth.”  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 26–27. 
 37 On the distinction between rules and standards, see, for example, Pierre Schlag, Rules and 
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985).  See also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword:  The 
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). 
 38 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 611 
(1992) (arguing that predictability will be enhanced if “precedent transforms standards 
into rules”). 
 39 In Dworkin’s coherence theory of law, Hercules was an ideal judge endowed with infinite 
patience and resourcefulness.  Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1083 
(1975). 
1104 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:4 
 
limited capacities and cognitive resources, and a hindsight bias that 
encourages courts to admit the fruits of successful searches,40 confining 
discretion to a suitable set of well-defined but imperfect rules is superior to 
ad hoc, totality-of-the-circumstances balancing in every case.41  Therefore, 
regardless of the historical and textual arguments about the primacy of the 
warrant requirement, the requirement is justifiable on pragmatic grounds.  
It reflects the judgment that in classical search cases—physical invasions of 
“persons, houses, papers, and effects” of members of the general public to 
generate evidence of crime or recover contraband—the balance of 
individual and state interests favors the individual whose security should not 
depend on the unchecked power of the police.  Rather, the police should 
have to establish, to the satisfaction of a neutral magistrate, that they have 
probable cause to justify subjecting individuals to the indignity, 
inconvenience, and interference with liberty or property incident to a search 
or seizure.42 
The task of the courts is not to re-evaluate this judgment, but merely to 
ascertain whether the case falls into this canonical category or instead 
involves a recognized set of circumstances captured in an exception to the 
warrant requirement.  If the case falls outside of all the exceptions, then the 
court must deem the search unconstitutional—unless, of course, the court 
can establish a new, limited exception by applying the principles and 
standards governing the recognition of exceptions.43 
The next section examines how the lower courts have applied this 
framework—and departed from it—in DNA database cases.  Importantly, 
 
 40 But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight 1–5 (Vanderbilt 
Univ. Law Sch. Public Law & Legal Theory Research Series, Paper No. 11-25, 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1877125 (finding that the hindsight bias influenced 
“judges’ assessments of the likely outcome of a search. . . . but [it] does not influence 
their legal rulings”). 
 41 Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 469 (1987) 
(defending older common law tort rules over ad hoc balancing of risk and utility). 
 42 For a contemporary defense of the value of warrants, see Oren Bar-Gill & Barry 
Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609 (2012). 
 43 If the scope of the exceptions is too large and their outcomes are too unpredictable, then 
the warrant requirement, as applied through a system of categorical exceptions, will not 
have the desired effect of protecting personal security from arbitrary police action.  To 
avoid this situation, the destabilizing exceptions could be constricted by requiring 
warrants in all situations in which it is practical and useful to obtain them.  See id. at 
165763 (proposing revamping the warrant requirement in this manner).  This 
modification of existing law is appealing, but it would have no impact on the 
constitutionality of warrantless data collection from all arrestees.  Either acquisition of 
biometric data from arrestees who are legitimately in custody is reasonable across the 
board or it is not.  Arrest warrants would be desirable to ensure that the detention is 
legitimate in the first instance, but once someone validly is in custody, all that the 
revamped warrant requirement advocated by Bar-Gill and Friedman demands is that the 
data collection be applied uniformly to well-defined classes of arrestees. 
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the sole established categorical exception that might justify taking DNA on 
arrest is the “special needs” exception.  It triggers a balancing test for 
reasonableness, but it is still part of the framework of predefined exceptions 
to the warrant requirement and is not arbitrarily available.  The courts, both 
federal and state, have split on whether DNA databases assembled after 
convictions (“DNA-AC”) are eligible for the special-needs exception.44  To 
clarify the scope of the exception, I propose a “special interests” theory to 
show that the exception does not reach the warrantless acquisition of 
information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy solely to 
build a criminal intelligence database to identify the perpetrators of past or 
future crimes.  It should apply, however, to databases that are strictly for 
authentication—and to those that serve both functions.  Because fingerprint 
databases clearly are multipurpose in operation, they can be analyzed under 
the special needs exception, so construed.  DNA databases, however, are 
closer to pure intelligence databases, making the applicability of the special-
needs exception more problematic. 
The DNA-BC (Before Conviction) cases have rejected special-needs 
balancing but arrived at the same endpoint by moving directly to totality-of-
the-circumstances balancing.45  Resort to this ad hoc balancing poisons the 
healthy framework of using defined exceptions.  The next section shows that 
totality balancing is consistent with only a small number of anomalous 
Supreme Court cases.  Yet if neither special-needs balancing nor totality 
balancing can be used to justify arrestee DNA sampling (when its sole 
purpose is to construct and operate a criminal-intelligence DNA database), 
it might seem that the minority of courts condemning DNA-BC are correct.  
This conclusion, however, is too hasty.  Both fingerprint and DNA databases 
should be eligible for a biometric exception that the courts, in their zeal to 
balance directly, have overlooked.46  Before describing and applying this 
exception, an exposition of the debate in the DNA-BC cases over the 
grounds for balancing is in order. 
B.  The Conflict over Special-Needs and Direct Balancing in the Arrestee Cases 
1.  A Preliminary Point 
The cases on arrestee DNA sampling agree on one preliminary matter—
penetrating the surface of the body to extract a blood sample or reaching 
 
 44 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 45 See infra Part II.B. 
 46 David H. Kaye, On the “Considered Analysis” of Collecting DNA Before Conviction, 60 UCLA L. 
REV. DISCOURSE 104 (2013) [hereinafter Kaye, Considered Analysis] (describing the 
leading cases). 
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inside the cheek to scrape away epithelial cells is a search of the person.  
Indeed, two Supreme Court opinions clearly support this consensus.47  
However, there is a plausible argument that taking cells for DNA analysis by 
having an arrestee spit into a cup or place his fingers on a sticky pad would 
not be a search,48 and some courts have held that the process of recording 
fingerprints (as distinguished from detaining a person for this purpose) 
does not amount to a search of the person.49  Furthermore, case law holds 
that collecting the samples from items or bodily material that the person in 
custody has discarded or shed is not a search or seizure.50  However, I shall 
not pursue these arguments for upholding external or surreptitious DNA 
sampling here.  Elsewhere, I have given reasons to conclude that removing 
 
 47 See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (scraping material from under a fingernail); 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (extracting blood for alcohol testing).  Cf. 
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (collecting urine for alcohol and 
drug testing is not a physical intrusion but is still considered a search because of the 
manner of collection and the information content).  Several courts have used the term 
“seizure” to describe the act of acquiring the cells from an individual who already is 
detained, but this is difficult to reconcile with the normal definition of a Fourth 
Amendment seizure.  See Kaye, Considered Analysis, supra note 46, at 111 (defining a 
seizure as “depr[ivation] of the possession of property or prevent[ing] an individual from 
moving away”). 
 48 Kaye, Arrest, supra note 7, at 480 (discussing critically the emphasis on bodily integrity in 
the case law); Justin A. Alfano, Note, Look What Katz Leaves Out:  Why DNA Collection 
Challenges the Scope of the Fourth Amendment, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1017, 103033 (2005) 
(discussing technological advances in DNA collection that may render the “intrusiveness 
paradigm irrelevant”).  But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Vickers, 38 F. Supp. 
2d 159, 165 (D.N.H. 1998) (“[A] grand jury subpoena compelling a citizen to provide 
saliva samples does implicate his or her Fourth Amendment rights.”); United States v. 
Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding the collection of a saliva sample to 
be a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment). 
 49 E.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Vikers, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 165 (“Fourth 
Amendment rights are not implicated by the grand jury’s request for fingerprints.”); 
Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 138182 (D. Alaska 1994) (concluding that the 
requirement to appear for fingerprinting as part of sex offender registration is a seizure, 
but fingerprinting itself is probably not a search); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 386 n.8 
(N.J. 1995) (“[B]ecause plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
fingerprints [or] photograph . . . the requirement to provide such information . . . does 
not constitute a search.”). 
 50 When no bodily invasion occurs—when DNA is shed or deposited naturally, or even 
acquired by deceit—courts have not perceived the reasonable expectation of privacy that 
defines a search under Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  E.g., Williamson v. State, 
993 A.2d 626, 630, 641 (Md. 2010) (retrieving a McDonald’s cup after a detainee ate 
dinner did not require a warrant); State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 31 (Wash. 2007) 
(affirming conviction of a suspect who had not been arrested but tricked into mailing a 
letter with his saliva on the envelope to the police); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried & 
D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing:  Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 43640 (2001) 
(discussing police acquisition of DNA from inadvertently abandoned cells).  But see 
United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2012) (treating a laboratory analysis of a 
lawfully acquired sample as a search). 
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cells from the exterior of the body is still a search,51 and the shed-DNA 
approach is not terribly practical for building a large arrestee database.52 
Of course, merely classifying DNA sampling and fingerprinting of 
arrestees as searches does not make them constitutionally unreasonable.  
Most courts have upheld DNA-BC after balancing individual and state 
interests,53 but several give no reason for their balancing test (beyond the 
fact that some form of balancing has been used in other DNA database cases 
or in other contexts, or that the parties did not question it).54 
2.  Choosing Between Special-Needs and Direct Balancing 
At this point, the leading DNA-BC case is United States v. Mitchell.55  A 
federal grand jury indicted Ruben Mitchell in 2009 for possession of cocaine 
with intent to distribute.56  The government sought a DNA sample at the 
initial appearance, but Mitchell objected on constitutional grounds.57  The 
district court declared that the federal law providing for pretrial DNA 
collection and inclusion in the national database was unconstitutional.58  
The Third Circuit granted an interlocutory appeal and also skipped over a 
normal three-judge panel to hear the case en banc.59  Over the objections of 
nearly a third of the court, it reversed.60 
The district court had applied the direct balancing test to strike down 
the law.61  The court of appeals applied the same test to uphold it.62  Neither 
court successfully justified the choice of the test in the first place.  The 
district court discussed the conflicting views expressed in convicted-offender 
cases with respect to the doctrinal basis for balancing.63  In “special-needs 
and administrative-search cases”64 
 
 51 Kaye, Arrest, supra note 7, at 48081 (noting the importance of the nature of the 
information obtained from the cells). 
 52 D.H. Kaye, Science Fiction and Shed DNA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 62, 6263 (2006) 
[hereinafter, Kaye, Science Fiction] (questioning the ability of already backlogged labs and 
burdened police forces to compile a large database from shed DNA). 
 53 See Kaye, Scorecard, supra note 5 (collecting cases). 
 54 See Kaye, Considered Analysis, supra note 46, at 11417 (criticizing the limited analysis in 
three such cases). 
 55 652 F.3d 387, 390 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 56 Id. at 389. 
 57 United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp.  2d 597, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2009). 
 58 Id. at 611 (declaring that 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) violates the Fourth Amendment). 
 59 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 391. 
 60 Id. at 416. 
 61 Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 60610. 
 62 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 403 (“[W]e . . . apply the totality of the circumstances test to the 
present challenge to the latest iteration of the DNA Act.”). 
 63 See Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (describing the division within the federal circuits on 
“special-needs” and “totality” balancing) (citations omitted). 
 64 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 208081 (2011). 
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A judicial warrant and probable cause are not needed where the search 
or seizure is justified by “special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement,” such as the need to deter drug use in public schools . . . or 
the need to assure that railroad employees engaged in train operations 
are not under the influence of drugs or alcohol . . . and where the search 
or seizure is in execution of an administrative warrant authorizing, for 
example, an inspection of fire-damaged premises to determine the cause 
. . . or an inspection of residential premises to assure compliance with a 
housing code.65 
Police agencies also can conduct such warrantless, suspicionless searches, as 
in (1) stops for questioning or observation at a fixed Border Patrol 
checkpoint,66 a sobriety checkpoint,67 or a checkpoint to question drivers 
about a recent hit-and-run accident;68 (2) inspections and seizures for the 
purpose of inventorying and preserving an arrestee’s possessions;69 (3) 
random “shakedown” searches of prison cells;70 and (4) even visual anal or 
vaginal examinations of pretrial detainees.71  In these kinds of cases, the 
court must first identify the special need for the administrative or other 
search and then ensure that the government’s interests in searching 
outweigh the individual interests in being free from the intrusion. 
Quoting from a dissenting opinion in an en banc Ninth Circuit DNA-AC 
case, the Mitchell district court decided that the special-needs exception 
could not apply because “[t]he unequivocal purpose of the searches 
 
 65 Id. at 2081 (citations omitted). 
 66 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 54550, 56667 (1976) (approving 
warrantless searches at a permanent Border Patrol checkpoint near the U.S.-Mexico 
border). 
 67 Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (“[T]he balance of the State’s 
interest in preventing drunken driving, the to which this system can reasonably be said to 
advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are 
briefly stopped, weights in favor of the state program.  We therefore hold that it is 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 68 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 42627 (2004) (noting the minimal interference to the 
public and the grave public concern involved with assisting police in their criminal 
investigation and suggesting practical considerations of limited police resources and 
community hostility to traffic delays will restrain proliferation of such investigations). 
 69 Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983) (“A range of governmental interests sup-
ports an inventory process.”); cf. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (uphold-
ing an extensive inventory search of an impounded car and its contents as an instance of 
“police caretaking procedures designed to secure and protect vehicles and their contents 
within police custody”). 
 70 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (declaring sweepingly that “the Fourth 
Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the 
confines of the prison cell”). 
 71 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 55860 (1979) (describing searches deemed “not 
unreasonable” after “[b]alancing the significant and legitimate security interests of the 
[detention facility] against the privacy interests of the [detainees]”); cf. Griffin v. 
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987) (holding as constitutional a warrantless search of 
probationer’s home with “reasonable grounds”). 
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performed pursuant to the DNA Act is to generate the sort of ordinary 
investigatory evidence used by law enforcement officials for everyday law 
enforcement purposes.”72  The Third Circuit agreed, observing that it (and 
most other circuits) already had rejected the special-needs exception in 
favor of direct balancing in DNA-AC cases.73  But rather than identify any 
principled basis for departing from the warrant requirement, the Third 
Circuit blandly—but dangerously—presented totality balancing as applying 
to Fourth Amendment cases without limit.  It wrote that balancing is “the 
key principle of the Fourth Amendment” and is “the general Fourth 
Amendment approach.”74  So much for the extended (though not 
unbroken) line of Supreme Court cases spanning many decades and 
expressing “the basic rule of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence” that 
warrantless searches not subject to categorical exceptions are “per se 
unreasonable.”75 
Unfortunately, even efforts such as the district court’s, to distinguish 
between “ordinary investigatory evidence” and other kinds of investigatory 
evidence, are frustratingly inconclusive.  Consider Illinois v. Lidster.76  Just 
after midnight on a Saturday, a vehicle struck and killed a seventy-year-old 
bicyclist.  The motorist drove off without identifying himself.  About one 
week later, local police established a midnight highway checkpoint where 
the fatal collision occurred.  Police cars with flashing lights forced traffic to 
stop so that an officer could ask the occupants whether they had seen 
anything happen there the previous weekend and distribute a flyer seeking 
assistance in the investigation.  As Robert Lidster approached the 
checkpoint in his minivan, he swerved, nearly hitting an officer who later 
smelled alcohol on Lidster’s breath.  “Lidster was tried and convicted in 
Illinois state court of driving under the influence of alcohol.”77 
The trial court rejected Lidster’s claim that the checkpoint stop violated 
the Fourth Amendment.  An Illinois appellate court and the Illinois 
Supreme Court determined that the warrantless, suspicionless law 
enforcement checkpoint did not advance a special need and therefore was 
 
 72 United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 604 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (quoting United 
States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 85556 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)). 
 73 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 403 (3d Cir. 2011) (adopting the totality-of-
circumstances test as the appropriate mode of analysis). 
 74 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Misreading Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 
(1977), the Ninth Circuit leapt to the same conclusion in Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 
(9th Cir.2012), reh’g en banc granted and opinions vacated, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).  
See Kaye, Drawing Lines, supra note 29. 
 75 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 82425 (1982). 
 76 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
 77 Id. at 422. 
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unconstitutional.78  The United States Supreme Court unanimously 
reversed, reasoning that stopping all drivers at a particular time and place to 
learn the identity of the perpetrator of the unsolved crime was an 
“information-seeking kind of stop”79 within the scope of the special-needs 
exception.80  One can read the case—as the Second Circuit has81—to imply 
that an information-seeking kind of database also is subject to special-needs 
balancing.  As in Lidster, the police are asking a subset of the public for 
information that could help them in unsolved cases with no clear “suspicion, 
or lack of suspicion, of the relevant individual.”82 
Alternatively, one can distinguish Lidster from DNA-BC on the ground 
that the police in Lidster were not seeking to gather evidence on Lidster 
himself.83  In contrast, the criminal-intelligence rationale for DNA-BC is that 
a database trawl might link the very arrestee who must submit to DNA 
sampling to a past crime or implicate him in a future one.  But this merely 
illustrates that phrases like “crime control,”84 “evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing,”85 “everyday law enforcement purposes,”86 and “ordinary 
investigatory evidence”87 are not sure boundary markers.  Lidster makes it 
plain that some law enforcement investigative practices are special-needs, 
and many lower courts have held that as long as the police are not seeking 
evidence of a suspect’s involvement in a specific crime that is still under 
investigation, they are engaging in a special-needs search.88  Indeed, in 
 
 78 Id. at 42223. 
 79 Id. at 424. 
 80 Justice Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented as to the disposition of the case.  They 
suggested that “the outcome of the multifactor test . . . is by no means clear on the facts” 
and they therefore would have remanded to the state courts to consider the outcome of 
the balancing test in the first instance.  Id. at 429. 
 81 United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that the collection of 
DNA samples to create a DNA index qualifies as a special need). 
 82 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004). 
 83 See id. at 423 (“The police expected the information elicited to help them apprehend, not 
the vehicle’s occupants, but other individuals.”). 
 84 Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000).  
 85 Id.  
 86 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 855 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
 87 Id. 
 88 E.g., Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 66869 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e find it crucial that 
the state, in collecting DNA samples, is not trying to determine that a particular 
individual has engaged in some wrongdoing” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
People v. Garvin, 847 N.E.2d 82, 91 (Ill. 2006) (determining that a DNA sample “does 
not, on its own, show the commission of a crime” and so is distinct “from the normal 
need for law enforcement”); Petitioner F v. Brown, 306 S.W.3d 80, 8990 (Ky. 2010) 
(finding that the government’s DNA sample collecting was not “for the immediate and 
sole purpose of collecting incriminating evidence” and thus it “fulfill[ed] a special need” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. O’Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 279 (N.J. 2007) 
(determining that a special need was present because of the impracticality of requiring 
individualized suspicion before obtaining a DNA sample of a convicted felon and because 
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upholding the detainee provisions of the federal database law, the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of New York applied the Second 
Circuit’s no-specific-investigation rationale.89 
To evaluate whether the special-needs exception extends to the 
intelligence function of DNA databases, we need something more revealing 
than the verbal formulae used to describe the types of searches embraced as 
“special” or “administrative” in the past.  We need an understanding of why 
the category exists.  The evocative phrase “special needs” first appeared in 
1985, in New Jersey v. T.L.O.90  A high school teacher brought two students 
she had found smoking in the lavatory to the principal’s office.  The 
assistant vice-principal searched the purse of one of the two, who denied the 
accusation, and discovered cigarettes and marijuana.  Citing an apparently 
disparate array of cases that permitted searches without warrants or probable 
cause, the Court sought to “strike the balance between the schoolchild’s 
legitimate expectations of privacy and the school’s equally legitimate need to 
maintain an environment in which learning can take place.”91  To this end, it 
dismissed “[t]he warrant requirement, in particular, [as] unsuited to the 
school environment [because it] would unduly interfere with the 
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in 
the schools,” and it reduced “the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed 
to justify a search”92 from probable cause to reasonable suspicion “under all 
the circumstances.”93 
The majority opinion, written by Justice White, contained passages that 
could be read to say that direct balancing is permissible in almost any kind 
of case.94  Seeking to cabin the resort to balancing, Justice Blackmun 
 
the testing was not for the immediate investigation of a specific crime); State v. Martin, 
955 A.2d 1144, 1153 (Vt. 2008) (upholding DNA sampling because the goals of the 
program were “beyond the normal goals of law enforcement”); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 
1076, 1085 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (finding that the “drawing of blood from convicted 
felons to establish a DNA bank for use in future prosecution of recidivist acts does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment” because it is a deterrent and thus not “normal” law 
enforcement). 
 89 United States v. Thomas, No. 10-CR-6172 CJS, 2011 WL 1627321 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 
2011), appeal pending. 
 90 469 U.S. 325, 332 n.2 (1985) (describing the “middle position” of the “majority of courts” 
to have been that “the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school 
authorities, but the special needs of the school environment require assessment of the 
legality of such searches against a standard less exacting than that of probable cause”). 
 91 Id. at 340. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 341 (“[T]he legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the 
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”). 
 94 Id. at 337, 340, 341. 
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expanded on the phrase “special needs” in a concurring opinion.95  He 
observed that “we have used such a balancing test, rather than strictly 
applying the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant and Probable-Cause Clause, only 
when we were confronted with a special law enforcement need for greater 
flexibility.”96  The reason for something “special,” Justice Blackmun 
explained, is that “the Amendment does not leave the reasonableness of 
most searches to the judgment of courts or government officers; the framers 
of the Amendment balanced the interests involved and decided that a 
search is reasonable only if supported by a judicial warrant based on 
probable cause.”97  Only when venturing outside the realm of “most 
searches” should the Court strike its own balance.  The boundary between 
ordinary searches (for which the framers had done the balancing) and the 
special situations (that justified contemporary balancing) is to be found in 
“those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause 
requirement impracticable.”98  Then and only then “is a court entitled to 
substitute its balancing of interests for that of the [f]ramers.”99 
Justice Blackmun’s effort to confine “the balancing test” to a defined 
category of cases100 is an improvement over the majority’s generalities, but it 
goes too far.  It would have been more apt to speak of special interests rather 
than special needs.  A court should never “substitute its balancing of interests 
for that of the [f]ramers.”101  Rather, a special interest creates a special 
need—because that interest was not factored into the original balancing.  
Therefore, the court should be allowed to do its own balancing in one 
bounded category of cases—those in which the interests differ in type from 
 
 95 Id. at 332 n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[T]he special needs of the school 
environment require assessment of the legality of such searches against a standard less 
exacting than that of probable cause.”). 
 96 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 496 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 97 Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
100 Id. at 352. 
101 Id. at 351.  One can object that Justice Blackmun’s reference to an original balancing 
performed by the Framers is bad history.  See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original 
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 551 (1999) (contending that the Fourth 
Amendment was originally understood only to set warrant standards); David E. Steinberg, 
The Uses and Misuses of Fourth Amendment History, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581, 584 (2008) 
(“[N]either the warrant preference rule nor the global reasonableness requirement 
receive support from Fourth Amendment history.”).  The history is the subject of 
continuing debate.  See Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 42, at 1613; see also authorities 
cited, supra note 29. But even if this view is correct, the concept of prior balancing 
producing a warrant requirement subject to categorical exceptions (one of which entails 
balancing) has pragmatic value in the administration of search and seizure law.  See supra 
Part I. 
Apr. 2013] ARRESTEE DNA 1113 
 
the canonical ones for which warrants and probable cause are necessary.102  
These exceptional cases are usually, but not always, distinct from the ones 
that merely enforce the criminal law.  In T.L.O., maintaining order in the 
schools added an interest that is not present in a classic search of a person, 
property, or papers for evidence of violations of the criminal or revenue 
laws.  The balance previously struck and crystalized in the form of the 
warrant requirement and its exceptions is appropriate for searches whose 
sole function is to produce evidence of an individual’s criminal conduct to 
be used in enforcing the law prohibiting that conduct.  But it does not 
necessarily fit a different set of interests.  To avoid a wooden and 
inappropriate form of Fourth Amendment analysis in this class of cases—but 
only in this class of cases—a court needs to return to first principles in 
judging reasonableness. 
Moreover, contrary to Justice Blackmun’s formulation, the class of 
special-interest cases is not coextensive with those for which warrants and 
probable cause are impractical.  Practicality is important in the balancing 
stage of a true special-interest case.  Impracticality indicates that the balance 
favors the government.  For example, a sobriety checkpoint furthers the 
special interest of removing impaired drivers from the roads regardless of 
subsequent criminal proceedings.  This justifies special-interest balancing—
because in addition to the normal interest in catching and punishing 
criminals, the state has an immediate interest in clearing the roads of 
dangerous drivers.103  That a warrant based on individualized suspicion 
makes it impossible to operate the checkpoint helps show that the program 
is constitutionally reasonable—that the balance favors the government—but 
it does not help in defining the class of cases for which reasonableness 
balancing is appropriate. 
 
102 This was not Justice Blackmun’s understanding of the “special needs” phrase that he 
coined to unify a variegated set of cases and to prevent them from eviscerating the 
warrant requirement. His conception of special needs explicitly encompassed “a special 
law enforcement need for greater flexibility” as exemplified in the “limited ‘stop and 
frisk’ upon less than probable cause” allowed in Terry v. Ohio. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351–52 
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1921, 2324 (1968)).  Nonetheless, the requirement of 
an interest beyond that of acquiring evidence against the target of the search is more 
consistent with his emphasis on the Framer’s original balancing.  The Ninth Circuit 
employed this idea in Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2009), which 
condemned the forced acquisition of a detainee’s DNA that was not authorized by 
statute.  The Friedman panel wrote that “the ‘special needs’ exception applies only to non-
law enforcement purposes.”  Id. at 853.  Unfortunately, this reformulation is too 
restrictive.  It is clear that the special-needs category encompasses some law enforcement 
purposes, as in Lidster. 
103 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 
U.S. 32, 39 (2000) (describing the roadblocks in Sitz as “clearly aimed at reducing the 
immediate hazard posed by the presence of drunk drivers on the highways”). 
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The difficulty with the articulation of the special-needs exception as 
proposed in T.L.O. and extended since then is that it exceeds the set of 
special-interests cases for which Justice Blackmun provided the rationale for 
balancing.  It also includes cases that merely involve the usual sets of 
individual and government interests in criminal investigations.  In these 
cases, impracticality can be a reason to create an exception to the warrant or 
probable cause requirements, as the Court has done for searches incident to 
arrest, but it is not a reason to balance the same set of individual and 
government interests any differently than the framers did.  Likewise, when 
the state’s intrusion is a lesser invasion of the interests of the affected 
individuals, as in the case of a limited stop-and-frisk rather than a full-blown 
arrest or search, a categorical exception to the warrant requirement is 
appropriate.  Again, these exceptions reflect a balancing process, but they 
are not themselves instances of special-interests balancing, and describing 
them as special-needs cases creates confusion.104 
Given the logic that underlies the special-needs exception, the 
intelligence-gathering function should not be considered a special need.  It 
might be a wonderful way to catch criminals and to deter individuals from 
certain crimes.  It could constitute a lesser intrusion on individual interests.  
It may be applied uniformly, without arbitrariness and abuse of power.  
These are all good reasons to recognize a biometric exception to the 
Warrant Clause as the defining feature of reasonableness as discussed in Part 
IV, but they involve no major105 special interests beyond those that produce 
the general rule against searches without warrants and probable cause.106 
 
104 For other efforts to impose more structure on the sprawling special-needs exception, see, 
for example, Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 254, 257 (2011); Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-
Abiding Public, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 162–63 (1989). 
105 Using a criminal intelligence database to check whether an arrestee is implicated in any 
unsolved crimes can further at least one special interest:  making a fully informed 
determination as to whether or not an arrestee should be released before trial (and, if so, 
under what special conditions).  See infra Part IV.B. The uncertain law governing mixed-
motive special-needs cases is discussed in Part III. 
106 Cf. Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists:  Why Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 
843, 870 (2010) (remarking in passing that characterizing “taking [of] DNA samples as a 
‘special need beyond the normal need for law enforcement’ . . . [is] a logically impossible 
task because the DNA database being assembled [is] used for traditional law enforcement 
purposes” (internal quotation omitted)).  The conclusion is perhaps less clear than this.  
One might say that the special-needs exception comes into play only when “police, and 
even administrative enforcement personnel, conduct searches for the primary purpose of 
obtaining evidence for use in criminal or other enforcement proceedings.”  O’Connor v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721 (1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).  Taking DNA from a 
convicted offender and retaining the resulting profile indefinitely puts the offender on 
notice that he might be exposed in any future crimes.  The specific-deterrence interest 
applies even when the evidence-seeking one does not.  Removing DNA profiles from the 
database for lack of conviction, however, attenuates this special interest. 
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Yet, in Mitchell and other DNA database cases, courts have balanced 
under another name—the “Totality of the Circumstances Analysis.”107  The 
actual balancing in totality cases is no different from that in special-interest 
cases—the court weighs the nature and furtherance of the government 
interests against the intrusion on the interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.108  The difference is what triggers the balancing.  Special-needs 
balancing, as we have seen, should require the presence of a non-law 
enforcement interest or a special kind of law enforcement interest.  Totality 
balancing is just a reversion to the philosophy of balancing whenever it suits 
the court—the very approach that Justice Blackmun decried in T.L.O., that 
Justice Brennan, dissenting in that case, derided as dangerous and 
incoherent,109 and that Justice Kagan recently described as atypical “free-
form balancing.”110 
Totality balancing became popular in DNA-AC cases following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Knights.111  Convicted of a drug 
offense, Mark James Knights was sentenced to summary probation “on the 
condition:  that Knights would ‘[s]ubmit his . . . person, property, place of 
residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a 
search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation 
officer or law enforcement officer.’”112  A detective, with ample reason to 
suspect that Knights was involved in acts of vandalism and arson against the 
Pacific Gas & Electric Company, entered Knight’s apartment without a 
warrant.  There, he found “a detonation cord, ammunition, liquid 
chemicals, instruction manuals on chemistry and electrical circuitry, bolt 
cutters, telephone pole-climbing spurs, drug paraphernalia, and a brass 
padlock stamped ‘PG&E.’”113  Before trial for conspiracy and weapons 
violations, Knights moved to suppress these items.  The district court 
granted the motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  These courts relied on 
 
107 United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2009). 
108 The Third Circuit has called the totality-of-the-circumstances test “more rigorous,” but it 
did not identify the source or nature of the extra rigor.  United States v. Sczubelek, 402 
F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005).  Second Circuit opinions describe special-needs balancing 
as “more rigorous,” but all they mean by this is that the government must demonstrate 
the existence of a special interest to reach the balancing stage.  See United States v. 
Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 79 n.6 (2d Cir. 2007). 
109 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 358 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Use of such a 
‘balancing test’ to determine the standard for evaluating the validity of a full-scale search 
represents a sizable innovation in Fourth Amendment analysis [that] finds support 
neither in precedent nor in policy and portends a dangerous weakening of the purpose 
of the Fourth Amendment to protect the privacy and security of our citizens.”); id. at 369 
(“[T]hese ‘balancing tests’ amount to . . . doctrinally destructive nihilism.”). 
110 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 25.  
111 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
112 Id. at 114. 
113 Id. at 115. 
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Griffin v. Wisconsin114 in which the Supreme Court had upheld warrantless 
searches of probationers as justified under the special-needs exception 
because they related to the operation of a state’s system for supervised 
release of offenders.115  In Knights, however, the search of the probationer’s 
apartment was not intended to advance this special interest, and no other 
exception to the warrant requirement applied.  Therefore, the lower courts 
held that the search was per se unreasonable. 
The Supreme Court reversed unanimously.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
who had no sympathy for the established exception-based-warrant-
requirement approach,116 wrote a brief opinion for the Court stating that 
“the search of Knights was reasonable under our general Fourth 
Amendment approach of ‘examining the totality of the circumstances,’ with 
the probation search condition being a salient circumstance.”117  The phrase 
“totality of the circumstances” did not come from any case in which the 
Court had substituted direct balancing for the better established exception-
based approach.  It came from the Chief Justice’s opinion several years 
earlier, in Ohio v. Robinette.118  Robinette concerned the voluntariness of a 
defendant’s consent to a search.119  Determinations of consent to a search or 
seizure,120 probable cause,121 reasonable suspicion,122 exigent 
circumstances,123 and excessive force124 are fact-intensive questions that turn 
 
114 483 U.S. 868 (1987). 
115  Id. at 876–77. 
116 E.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (rejecting 
“judicially created preference” for warrants). 
117 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (citation omitted). 
118 519 U.S. 33 (1996). 
119 Id. at 35. 
120 E.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (“[T]o determine whether a particular 
encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding 
the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a 
reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or 
otherwise terminate the encounter.”). 
121 E.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“The probable-cause standard is 
incapable of precise definition . . . because it deals with probabilities and depends on the 
totality of the circumstances.”); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)(“[P]robable 
cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual 
contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”). 
122 E.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (discussing how courts “must look 
at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has 
a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing”); United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (explaining that to judge “what cause is sufficient to 
authorize police to stop a person . . . the totality of the circumstances—the whole 
picture—must be taken into account”). 
123 E.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (keeping an individual suspected of 
having marijuana in a trailer from entering the trailer alone while officers applied for a 
search warrant was reasonable under “the circumstances of the case before us”).  But see 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (adopting a rule that “a warrant to search 
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on the circumstances of the case.  In these kinds of cases, a court must 
consider all the factual circumstances—the totality of the circumstances—
but it does not normally weigh two sets of interests.125  Ripping the phrase 
out of context to describe or justify ad hoc balancing of interests, as the 
Chief Justice did in Knights, is unpersuasive and destabilizing. 
Four short years later, Justice Thomas picked up the ball that the Chief 
Justice tossed in Knights.  Writing for the Court in Samson v. California,126 
Thomas applied the same direct balancing test as if it were the “general 
Fourth Amendment approach”127 to permit a warrantless, suspicionless 
search of a parolee that uncovered methamphetamine in his pocket.128  As in 
Knights, it would have been difficult to rationalize the search in terms of the 
state’s special interest in supervising released prisoners, and the majority in 
Samson did not even try. 
All this was too much for Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer.  Although 
they had expressed no qualms about Knights’ adoption of direct balancing as 
the mode of analysis, and they did not contest it in Samson, they did attack 
the outcome of the direct balancing test.  They challenged this result by 
emphasizing that the Samson Court was the first to approve of suspicionless 
searching on the whim of a solitary police officer.  The police officer in 
Knights had reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause.  The officer in 
Samson had nothing.  In effect, the dissent maintained that neither special-
needs nor totality balancing should permit such searches. 
Knights and Samson sit poised to devour any Fourth Amendment cases 
founded on normal categorizing.  “Unlike the special needs doctrine, 
Knights provides no threshold test to decide when balancing can 
 
for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority 
to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted” (footnote 
omitted)). 
124 E.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (“Although respondent’s attempt to craft an 
easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context is admirable, in the end we 
must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of reasonableness.’”). 
125 In Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 61314 (2007) (per curiam), the Court 
referred to Summers, 452 U.S. at 692, as “weighing whether the search in [that case] was 
reasonable” in view of the balance between the “incremental intrusion on personal 
liberty” and the government’s interests in safely and efficaciously searching pursuant to a 
warrant.  But the real balancing in Summers occurred at the level of deciding that it can be 
constitutionally reasonable to “detain the occupants of the premises while a proper 
search [for contraband] is conducted.”  Summers, 452 U.S. at 705.  Even though this right 
to detain the occupants during a search may be implicit in the warrant, as Summers held, 
whether a particular detention is unreasonably long or abusive turns on the 
circumstances of the case. 
126 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
127 Id. at 852 n.3. 
128 Id. at 855 (“California’s supervisory system is drawn to meet its needs and is reasonable, 
taking into account a parolee’s substantially diminished expectation of privacy.”). 
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appropriately replace the warrant and probable cause requirements.”129  
Nonetheless, it is possible that few such cases will be drawn into their sphere.  
Despite the aggressive pronouncements in Knights and Samson (and now 
Mitchell and other DNA-BC cases) that a direct resort to balancing is the 
general rule, it remains an anomaly in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
Except for the two P’s—probationers and parolees—the Court proceeds 
with business as usual, which is to say categorical analysis of the need for a 
warrant.130  Thus, in Arizona v. Gant,131 Justice Stevens wrote for the Court, 
without a backwards glance to Knights and Samson, that 
[c]onsistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it should in every 
case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the basic 
rule that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions. 132 
A year later, in City of Ontario v. Quon,133 every Justice subscribed to this 
proposition.  The next Term, in Kentucky v. King,134 every Justice embraced 
the basic rule.  It would be best to acknowledge explicitly that the analytical 
framework of Knights and Samson is inconsistent with precedent and to 
 
129 Antoine McNamara, Note, The “Special Needs” of Prison, Probation, and Parole, 82 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 209, 240 (2007). 
130 Various commentators seem to regard the per se rule as moribund.  E.g., Orin S. Kerr, 
The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 318 (2012) 
(“Reasonableness now is understood as requiring a balancing of interests . . . .”); Cynthia 
Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth:  the Future of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 
MISS. L.J. 1133, 1135 (2012) (“Instead of interpreting the Fourth Amendment as 
expressing a preference for warrants, the modern Court reads the text of the Fourth 
Amendment as simply requiring reasonableness.”); William W. Greenlaugh & Mark J. 
Yost, In Defense of the “Per Se” Rule:  Justice Stewart’s Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendment’s 
Warrant Clause, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1019 (1994) (“[T]he Court has all but rejected 
the ‘per se’ rule and strengthened its embrace of the ‘reasonableness’ approach.”).  
Professor Lee adds, however, that “[i]ronically, even though today’s Court does not 
accord the warrant preference view the premier status it once held, the Court still applies 
it in the bulk of its cases.”  Id. at 1146.  This pattern is less ironic when one recognizes 
that the Court understandably employs a balancing approach in (1) establishing 
categorical exceptions to the warrant or probable cause requirements, (2) applying the 
special-needs exception to cases involving special interests, and (3) determining whether 
the method of effecting a search or seizure is unreasonable.  Outside of these situations 
(and the two probationer-parolee cases), the Court continues to use the categorical 
framework to ascertain the reasonableness of searches undertaken to acquire evidence in 
criminal cases. 
131 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
132 Id. at 338 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) and applying the 
incident-to-arrest exception instead of direct balancing). 
133 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (quoting Katz and applying the special-needs exception). 
134 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1853–54 (2011) (analyzing the reasonableness of a search of a home 
from the standpoint of a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement (for exigent 
circumstances) rather than via a direct inquiry into what might seem reasonable). 
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defend the outcomes, if at all, on different grounds.135  This more forthright 
approach would confine direct balancing to the two P’s (or better, eliminate 
it entirely). 
The availability of totality balancing prompted an exchange among the 
Ninth Circuit judges on the panel in United States v. Pool.136  The two judges 
who were willing to uphold DNA-BC (at least after an indictment) offered 
no opinion on “whether the DNA collection provision could meet the 
special needs test because our precedent directs us to apply the totality of 
the circumstances test.”137  With that standard in place, they deemed the 
federal detainee law constitutional.138  Despite the circuit’s previous use of 
the sweeping and inaccurate language of Samson and Knights about the 
universality of direct balancing,139 the dissenting judge sought to confine 
totality balancing to the two P’s.  She emphasized that “[t]he Supreme Court 
has upheld searches as a condition of release under [the totality] test only 
after an individual has been convicted of a crime and hence has a lowered 
privacy interest.”140 
 
135 One could maintain (none too convincingly) that the departure from the normal 
framework was suitable because “those people” consented to the conditions of their 
supervised release or because they are out of prison as an act of grace that does not 
include the normal freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.  See Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843, 86364 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra 7, at 11 (Sotomayor, J.).  For critical discussion of these theories, see 
McNamara, supra note 129. 
136 United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
137 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1218. 
138 Id. at 122023. 
139 United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 947 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Taking our cue from Samson, 
we reaffirm that ‘the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,’ and adopt 
the ‘general Fourth Amendment approach,’ which ‘examin[es] the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether a search is reasonable.’” (citations omitted)). 
140 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1235 (Schroeder, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1237 (finding that no 
“exception under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach applies because Pool, as a 
pretrial defendant, does not have the reduced privacy interests of the convicted felons in 
Kincade or Kriesel”).  As McNamara, supra note 129, observed, other Ninth Circuit judges 
have interpreted Knights as creating an implicit threshold requirement:  Balancing 
is allowed only because of the probationer’s ‘diminished expectation of privacy.’  
E.g., United States v. , 379 F.3d 813, 832 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (plurality 
opinion) (“Knights . . . affirmed the . . . possibility that conditional releasees’ 
diminished expectations of privacy may be sufficient to justify the judicial 
assessment of a parole or probation search’s reasonableness outside the strictures 
of special needs analysis.”). 
  Id. at 240 n.204.  In a subsequent Ninth Circuit case upholding California’s DNA-BC law, 
a dissenting opinion of Judge Fletcher not only maintained that totality balancing was 
unavailable, but that Supreme Court cases on fingerprinting established that the 
California law infringed the Fourth Amendment.  This claim rests on an obvious 
misreading of the fingerprint cases.  See Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1065–66 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
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This observation begs the question of why the Court’s putatively “general 
Fourth Amendment approach” should apply just to this specific category of 
people.  True, the Court spoke of the diminished expectations of privacy in 
Knights and Samson as arising from notice to a parolee or probationer that 
he would be at risk of warrantless or suspicionless searches.  But the Court 
referred to a lowered privacy interest only as a part of the totality of 
circumstances to be considered in judging reasonableness.141  The Court did 
not present it as the reason to switch to totality balancing.  Changing a factor 
considered in totality balancing to the threshold requirement for 
undertaking that balancing “would not render the approach any more 
principled.”142  Why should the judgment that some groups are notified that 
they have fewer protections, or that they are liable to other intrusions (to 
further some special governmental interest), subject them to indiscriminate 
totality balancing?143  Furthermore, it leaves opens the argument that direct 
balancing is appropriate for arrestees because they too have a “lowered 
privacy interest,” as shown by the historic practice of forcing them to provide 
the state with their fingerprints and photographs.144  It is not so easy to chain 
Knights and Samson to the two P’s. 
In sum, neither totality balancing nor special-needs balancing offers the 
best mode of analyzing the intelligence-gathering function of biometric 
database systems.  Direct balancing repudiates the normal method of 
analysis—classifying practices via reasonably well-defined exceptions to the 
warrant requirement.  To be sure, the boundaries of the special-needs 
exception are not well marked, but no special interest justifies sheltering the 
collection of biometric data for generating evidence in criminal cases with 
that exception. 
Fortunately, there are better ways to analyze fingerprinting and DNA 
sampling on arrest.  In the final Parts of this Article, I examine two possible 
ways to uphold these practices.  Part III discusses what I call the two-step 
shuffle and the unexplored territory of multiple needs.  It is a branch of 
special-needs analysis that deserves renewed attention and revision in the 
Supreme Court.  Specifically, I suggest that multipurpose search regimes 
should be eligible for special-needs balancing.  Part IV looks into the 
 
141 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 84849 (2006) (recapitulating Knights’ reasoning); 
id. at 852 (relying in the course of its balancing on the conclusion that “parolees . . . have 
severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status alone”). 
142 McNamara, supra note 129, at 240 n.204. 
143 Cf. Paul M. Monteleoni, Note, DNA Databases, Universality, and the Fourth Amendment, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 26970 (2007) (“[A] diminished privacy interest is a conclusory 
finding, and its use to justify an exception to the warrant requirement is thus circular.”). 
144 E.g., Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 704–05 (Va. 2007) (analogizing DNA 
testing to the historic practice of fingerprinting). 
Apr. 2013] ARRESTEE DNA 1121 
 
balancing itself and presents a new categorical exception for certain types of 
biometric data. 
III.  THE TWO-STEP SHUFFLE AND MULTIPLE-NEEDS ANALYSIS 
A.  Fingerprint Databases for Authentication and Intelligence 
The earliest widespread use of fingerprints in the criminal justice system 
was authentication—verifying or establishing the identity of a prisoner.145  
Initially, the fingerprint cards supplemented a set of body measurements 
devised by Alphonse Bertillon, a clerk in the Prefecture of Police in Paris, 
France, and adopted there in 1882.  “Bertillon’s anthropometric method 
measured height, reach (middle finger to middle finger of outstretched 
arms), trunk, length of head, width of head, length of right ear, width of 
right ear, length of left foot, length of left middle finger, length of left little 
finger, and length of left forearm.”146  By 1894, all new arrestees in England 
and Bengal “were measured and fingerprinted.”147  In 1897, after a workable 
system for classifying fingerprints was developed, “the government of India 
sanctioned the sole use of fingerprints as a means of identification for 
prisoners,”148 avoiding the laborious task of measuring body parts. 
In 1902, Bertillon went through his fingerprint cards from prisoners 
until he found one that contained an inked print that seemed to match the 
photograph of a bloody print on a piece of broken glass found at the scene 
of a murder.149  Thus was born the use of fingerprint records as an 
intelligence database.  In 1924, the FBI established its Identification Division 
“to provide a central repository of criminal identification data for law 
enforcement agencies throughout the United States.”150  From an original 
810,188 records, the FBI’s criminal file grew to about fifteen million 
individuals by the early 1960s.151  Despite refinements in the classification 
system, manual searching was becoming impracticable.  Automated 
 
145 Jeffery G. Barnes, History, in THE FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK 1-10 (Alan McRoberts & 
Debbie McRoberts eds., 2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
225321.pdf.  Prior to this development, fingerprints were used as evidence in a few 
criminal cases.  Id. at 1-8 (referring to an exoneration in 1880); id. at 1-9 to 1-10 
(referring to “the first homicide solved by fingerprint evidence” in 1892). 
146 Id. at 1-12. 
147 Id. at 1-14. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 1-15 to 1-16 (quoting Charles R. Kingston & Paul L. Kirk, Historical Development and 
Evaluation of the “12 Point Rule” in Fingerprint Identification, 20 INT. CRIM. POLICE REV. 62 
(1965)); SIMON COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES:  A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL 
IDENTIFICATION 17071 (2001). 
150 Moses et al., supra note 13, at 6–4. 
151 Id. 
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fingerprint identification systems capable of trawling large databases of 
digitalized images for possible matches to latent prints from crime scenes 
emerged in the 1970s.152  These systems scored successes in the 1980s153 and 
underwent “frenzied expansion” in the 1990s.154  Today, the FBI’s criminal 
file houses the fingerprints and criminal histories of more than seventy 
million people.155 
I rehearse this history to suggest that using fingerprint databases to 
discover suspects is not exactly a second-generation technology.  The 
potential intelligence function of fingerprint databases was known from the 
outset of arrestee fingerprinting in America.  Despite the possibility that the 
fingerprint card collections would generate evidence for unrelated 
prosecutions, as Bertillon’s 1902 trawl did, early courts generally brushed 
aside due process challenges to photographing and fingerprinting 
arrestees.156  Presumably, today’s courts would uphold arrestee 
fingerprinting against a Fourth Amendment challenge either as too minor 
an intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests to create a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and hence to constitute a “search or seizure”157 or as 
constituting a reasonable search under the special-needs exception.158 
Yet, these conclusions are not self-evident.  Fingerprints are not as visible 
to the public as physical appearance, handwriting, or voice,159 and they 
might contain a quantum of information that could be used for purposes 
other than identification.160  Expelling them from the realm of the Fourth 
Amendment therefore seems too harsh.  And, although the special-needs 
 
152 Id. at 6-6 to 6-7. 
153 Id. at 6-7 to 6-8. 
154 Id. at 6-8. 
155 Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/
cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis, (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). 
156 See sources cited supra notes 9, 24. 
157 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Vickers, 38 F. Supp. 2d 159, 165 (D.N.H. 
1998) (holding that fingerprinting and hair sampling are not searches); Palmer v. State, 
679 N.E.2d 887, 891 (Ind. 1997) (holding that taking fingerprints at trial was not an 
unreasonable seizure); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1381, 1384 (D. Alaska 1994) 
(holding that requiring sex offenders to appear for fingerprinting and sex offender 
registration is an unreasonable seizure, but that fingerprinting itself is not a search). 
158 See, e.g., United States v. Laub Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217, 22225 (N.D. Ohio 1968) 
(distinguishing the identification uses of fingerprints from evidentiary uses and holding 
that the identification use promotes a legitimate governmental interest that renders the 
fingerprinting of those formally charged with crimes not a search). 
159 See, e.g., United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973) (no reasonable expectation of 
privacy implicated in being forced to provide a handwriting sample); United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 1415 (1973) (no reasonable expectation of privacy implicated in 
being forced to provide a voice sample). 
160 See infra Part IV. 
Apr. 2013] ARRESTEE DNA 1123 
 
exception works well for a database system for authentication, how does that 
justify its application to a database for intelligence purposes?161 
It is tempting to answer this last question by invoking the doctrine that 
once the government has acquired information legitimately, it may use it 
freely without again triggering the Fourth Amendment.162  For instance, 
once police, proceeding within the scope of a valid search warrant, learn 
that a suspect has a pair of size twelve Bruno Magli shoes in his closet, they 
may use this fact to tie the suspect to later crimes in which size twelve Bruno 
Magli shoeprints are discovered.  Thus, courts have held that repeating a 
database trawl requires no further Fourth Amendment justification163 and 
that acquiring a DNA profile pursuant to a court order in one case allows it 
to be reused in an independent investigation without a new court order.164  
Likewise, it is clear that police may use the information gleaned for a 
“special purpose” in a criminal case against the searched individual.  For 
instance, the police may make an inventory of the possessions of detainees 
in accordance with a “standardized procedure” that advances “a range of 
governmental interests,”165 and drugs discovered in such a special-needs 
search are admissible in a trial for illegal possession.166  Similarly, it might 
 
161 Compare Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks:  Use Restrictions Under the Fourth 
Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 94–95 (1995) (arguing that, for fingerprinting, the 
governmental interest in identifying criminal suspects outweighs any privacy concerns), 
with Simmons, supra note 106, at 849 (advocating a doctrinal change that would forbid 
the state from making any criminal evidentiary use of the fruits of special-needs searches). 
162 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Essay, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 20 (2008) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require governments to discard any 
information they have already lawfully collected.”) 
163 See Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 62 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that retrawling even after 
a sentence is completed is not a new search).  For a defense of this result, see David H. 
Kaye, DNA Database Trawls and the Definition of a Search in Boroian v. Mueller, 97 VA. L. 
REV. IN BRIEF 41, 49 (2011). 
164 See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 752 A.2d 1250, 126869 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (holding that 
fresh court authorization is not required before the police may use a sample validly 
collected for a different purpose); People v. King, 663 N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1997) (“[O]nce a person’s blood sample has been obtained lawfully, he can no longer 
assert either privacy claims or unreasonable search and seizure arguments with respect to 
the use of that sample.”). 
165 See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983) (“[I]t is entirely proper for police to 
remove and list or inventory property found on the person or in the possession of an 
arrested person who is to be jailed.  A range of governmental interests supports an 
inventory process.”); see also id. at 647 (“[S]tandardized inventory procedures are 
appropriate to serve legitimate governmental interests . . . .”). 
166 Id. at 64243.  In Lafayette, Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to an “inventory search” as “a 
well-defined exception to the warrant requirement,” id. at 643, but the case plainly falls 
within the rubric of “special needs” announced two years later in New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 
U.S. 325, 333 n.2 (1985), for the Court proceeded to balance “intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against . . . promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.”  Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 654 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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seem that once the state has stored a fingerprint for authentication in the 
event of later arrests or has run a fingerprint through an AFIS database to 
authenticate identity, it also may check it against latent prints from unsolved 
crimes.  The argument proceeds in two quick steps.  First, the state may 
collect the sample without a warrant to meet the special interest in 
authentication.  Second, having legitimately acquired the sample, the state 
may use it for investigation. 
Two Supreme Court cases stand in the way of this two-step shuffle.  In 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,167 the Court declined to apply the special-
needs exception to a program in which police used dogs to sniff for drugs in 
vehicles pulled over in groups at fixed roadblocks.168  Distinguishing sharply 
between “highway safety interests and the general interest in crime 
control,”169 the majority reasoned that “[b]ecause the primary purpose of 
the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of 
ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth 
Amendment.”170  Likewise, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court 
invalidated a program in which a state university hospital tested urine 
samples from pregnant women for cocaine and reported positive results to 
the police to convince the women to participate in substance-abuse 
counseling in lieu of criminal prosecution.171  Again, the majority of the 
Court emphasized “the relevant primary purpose”172—which was said to be 
“the arrest and prosecution of drug-abusing mothers.”173 
These cases can block the first step of the shuffle.  They purport to 
prevent the state from relying on the special-needs exception for a “program 
whose primary purpose [is] to detect evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing”174 or whose “immediate objective [is] to generate evidence for 
law enforcement purposes . . . .”175  But whether these words are an 
insurmountable obstacle to fingerprint intelligence databases is 
questionable.  Neither Ferguson nor Edmond required the Court to 
distinguish between a primary and a secondary motive, or to respond to two 
 
167 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
168 Id. at 44. 
169 Id. at 40. 
170 Id. at 4142.  Six Justices subscribed to this view.  Justice O’Connor wrote the majority 
opinion.  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion, which was joined, in part, by 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, argues against “a new non-law enforcement primary purpose 
test lifted from a distinct area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relating to the searches 
of homes and businesses.”  Id. at 53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
171 532 U.S. 67, 7576 (2001). 
172 Id. at 81. 
173 Id. at 82 (quoting Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 484 (4th. Cir. 2009) 
(Blake, J., dissenting in part)). 
174 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000). 
175 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83. 
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motives of equal importance.  Despite the Court’s use of the words “primary” 
and “secondary,” neither Ferguson nor Edmond was a mixed-motive case.  
Both were single-motive cases involving single-purpose programs.  As a 
result, the “primary purpose” language is dicta. 
Because this aspect of the cases has generally gone unnoticed, it may be 
helpful to elaborate slightly.  In Ferguson, the state hospital adopted a 
cocaine testing program that relied on the criminal law not to punish 
women, but to induce them to comply with drug abuse programs.176  
Nevertheless, the state hospital established the testing program in 
consultation with the police department for the express purpose of 
obtaining evidence for criminal cases.177  Consequently, the Court was able 
to say that the sole immediate purpose of the program was to generate 
evidence against cocaine users for criminal prosecutions.178  This, in turn, 
permitted the final conclusion:  A program that has as its only immediate 
goal subjecting individuals to the criminal law involves no special needs. 
Discerning the primacy of the general crime-control purpose in Edmond 
was even easier, for this was the only purpose the city proffered.179  How the 
Court would have handled a more complicated system therefore remained 
unsettled.  The majority was clear on this, stating that it was not considering 
“whether the State may establish a checkpoint program with the primary 
purpose of checking licenses or driver sobriety and a secondary purpose of 
interdicting narcotics.”180  The city could have accomplished this by initially 
establishing roadblocks strictly to check for intoxicated drivers.  After 
employing this program for a decent interval, it could have added a dog-sniff 
in parallel with the sobriety check.  The sobriety checkpoint would have 
been consistent with ample precedent allowing such stops for special 
needs.181  The interdiction-by-dog step would not have been a search.  The 
Court already had held,182 and all the Justices in Edmond agreed,183 that dog-
sniffing for drugs does not rise to the level of a search.  The Edmond majority 
specifically chose to “express no view on the question whether police may 
expand the scope of a license or sobriety checkpoint seizure in order to 
detect the presence of drugs in a stopped car.”184 
 
176 Id. at 83 (“[T]he threat of law enforcement intervention . . . provided the necessary 
‘leverage’ to make the [p]olicy effective.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
177 Id. at 82–83. 
178 Id. at 8284. 
179 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 n.2. 
180 Id. 
181 E.g., Mich. Dep’t. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
182 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706–07 (1983). 
183 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 707); id. at 48, 52 (Rehnquist, C.J. 
dissenting). 
184 Id. at 47 n.2. 
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Mixed-motive or primary-purpose analysis is a major headache in many 
areas of the law, including torts, criminal law, and employment 
discrimination.185  The analysis of purpose in constitutional adjudication is 
notoriously slippery.186  It is not surprising that Edmond and Ferguson offer no 
guidance on how to handle a case in which the legislature or agency 
adopting a program of warrantless searches has simultaneously mixed 
motives—both normal law enforcement and other interests.  Although the 
Court’s discomfort with pretextual special-needs searching is 
understandable,187 it is a little odd to consider motive at all in special-needs 
cases.  How is it that the balance of interests permits dispensing with 
warrants or individualized suspicion when non-law enforcement interests 
alone are pursued, but not when both law enforcement and non-law 
enforcement interests reinforce each other? 
Arrestee fingerprinting seems to present the situation that Edmond and 
Ferguson do not quite reach.  Historically, authentication was the dominant 
reason for collecting prints; searching for matches to latent prints was 
secondary.188  Given the confluence of good reasons to acquire prints, even 
today—when the authentication and intelligence functions of fingerprint 
databases are equally clear—the special-needs exception should apply.  
Courts should be able to balance the full set of government interests against 
the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests to gauge reasonableness.  The 
 
185 See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson:  Mixed Motives and 
Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279 (2007) (distinguishing among several 
approaches to the problem of mixed motives in various areas and arguing against “mixed-
motive analysis” as a defense to racially motivated peremptory challenges to jurors); David 
Crump, Overruling Crawford v. Washington:  Why and How, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 115, 
134 (2012) (complaining that the primary-purpose test for determining whether a 
statement is “testimonial” and hence subject to the Confrontation Clause is 
indeterminate); Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, The Common Law, and Proximate 
Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (arguing that tort concepts of proximate cause should not be 
used in mixed-motive statutory discrimination cases). 
186 The domains in which the Court considers whether legislation is motivated by an 
impermissible purpose are catalogued in Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword:  Implementing the 
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 70–73 (1997).  On the history of judicial methods for 
inferring motive, see Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1784 (2008). 
187 When a search or seizure is not conducted pursuant to a program that dispenses with 
individualized suspicion, or when such suspicion is present, the Court abjures all inquiry 
into motive and pretext.  Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 (2011). 
188 Simon A. Cole, Fingerprint Identification and the Criminal Justice System:  Historical Lessons for 
the DNA Debate, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:  THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 
63, 73 (David Lazer ed., 2004). 
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result, as indicated in the discussion of such interests in Part IV, would be for 
courts to sustain current fingerprinting practices.189 
B.  DNA Databases for Authentication and Intelligence 
The legislative history of existing arrestee DNA databases resembles the 
monochromatic evidence of motive in Edmond and Ferguson.  Realistically, 
the overwhelming legislative purpose of arrestee sampling, given that 
fingerprinting already is in place, has been intelligence.  Therefore, it seems 
difficult to use the two-step shuffle to justify DNA sampling on arrest. 
Nonetheless, states can rebrand arrestee DNA profiling as a component 
of a multi-modal authentication system using fingerprints, photographs, iris 
scans, and who knows what else.190  The cost and ease of DNA testing will 
continue to drop.191  Although fingerprints are superior to DNA for 
authentication when it is important to distinguish between monozygotic 
(identical) twins,192 computerized DNA profiles are easier to search for 
matching records without expert human assistance than are AFIS databases.  
Officials might want to store both fingerprint and DNA data for 
authentication, just as they once stored both anthropometric and 
fingerprint data.  Indeed, in Maryland v. King, all fifty states argued in an 
amicus brief that “like photograph and palm print databases, forensic 
identification DNA databases are not superfluous to fingerprints even for 
record keeping purposes.  DNA profiles can and do resolve conflicts in 
fingerprint and criminal history data, allowing states to recognize incorrect 
entries.”193  Although this rationale seems like an afterthought, a state that 
has not adopted an arrestee DNA requirement could create a legislative 
 
189 See Krent, supra note 161 (arguing that it would be reasonable to create a fingerprint 
database for use in future investigations since the law enforcement interests outweigh the 
suspects’ privacy interests). 
190 Brief of California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16, Maryland v. King, 
133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) (No. 12-207) [hereinafter States’ Amicus Brief]; Next Generation 
Identification, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi (last visited Feb. 
11, 2013). 
191 Only twelve years ago, DNA identification seemed so slow, expensive, and limited in the 
range of cases to which it would apply, that it could not match the power and ease of 
fingerprinting.  See COLIN BEAVAN, FINGERPRINTS:  THE ORIGINS OF CRIME DETECTION AND 
THE MURDER CASE THAT LAUNCHED FORENSIC SCIENCE 202 (2001) (arguing that 
fingerprinting is more useful than DNA analysis). 
192 Differences between monozygotic twins probably can be detected in DNA samples, but 
the genetic or epigenetic features that might be useful change during the individuals’ 
lifetimes.  See C.T. Li et al., Epigenetics and Its New Progress in Monozygotic Twins, 25 FA YI 
XUE ZA ZHI 212 (2009); Daniel Schlieper et al., Discrimination of Monozygotic Twins (and 
Clones) on the DNA Level, 1239 INT’L CONGRESS SERIES 857, 858 (2003) (suggesting a 
method to use DNA analysis to distinguish between monozygotic twins based on B 
lymphocytes). 
193 States’ Amicus Brief, supra note 190, at 19. 
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history indicative of multiple purposes, and states with laws in place could 
amend them to provide explicitly for both authentication and intelligence 
uses of the identification profiles. 
To be sure, a court aggressively enforcing a primary-purpose test for 
special-needs balancing might dismiss this legislative strategy as ineffectual.  
Rather than pursue the questionable and elusive primary-purpose test, 
however, I shall move to the final issue in assessing the constitutionality of 
including arrestee data in biometric databases.  In the end, the issue is 
balancing.  The route to this balancing could be the direct (and doubtful) 
step of totality balancing that the Court took in Knights and Samson for 
offenders on supervised release.  It could be the special-needs exception for 
the pursuit of “normal” law enforcement interests (also doubtful for a 
database with a pure intelligence function but defensible for a database with 
a mixed function).  Or, as discussed below, it could be the exception-
creating balancing long associated with the warrant requirement. 
IV.  BALANCING AND THE BIOMETRIC EXCEPTION 
The courts that have balanced the interests of the state and the arrested 
individual, whether under the totality-of-the-circumstances or the special-
needs rubric, have generally agreed on the constitutionality of DNA 
collection before conviction.194  The range of interests considered in this 
mélange of cases varies, as does the willingness of each judge to give much 
weight to various factors.  To avoid repetition and inordinate detail on each 
balancing test, I shall present and assess the more significant interests in the 
context of the pre-exception balancing that have led the Supreme Court to 
recognize certain exceptions to the general rule that a search requires a 
warrant and probable cause.  The balancing analysis would be quite similar 
under the label of “special needs” or “totality of the circumstances.”  I begin 
with the government’s interest in gathering biometric data, then proceed to 
 
194 Six of these ten courts have found that the scales tip in favor of DNA–BC.  See Kaye, 
Scorecard, supra note 5.  However, dissenting judges in some of these cases sharply 
criticized the majorities’ evaluation of the balance of interests.  See, e.g., Haskell v. Harris, 
669 F.3d 1049, 1073 (9th Cir. 2012) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (“[I]f DNA is taken from 
arrestees . . . for the purposes of identification, that taking is permissible.  However, if it is 
taken solely for the purposes of investigation, that taking is a seizure in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.”), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 416 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Rendell, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he majority gives short shrift to an arrestee’s and pretrial detainee’s 
expectation of privacy in his DNA, reducing it to an interest in identity only, and 
overstates the significance of the Government’s interest in collecting evidence to solve 
crimes.”); United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 2010) (Schroeder, J. 
dissenting) (dismissing the government’s professed interests as “meaningless” or 
inapposite prior to a conviction), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
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the individual’s interests in not revealing the data.  The analysis supports a 
unified and circumscribed biometric exception that permits the government 
to acquire fingerprints and DNA before any conviction. 
A.  The Authentication Interest:  True Identity 
As discussed in Part I, the state has substantial interests in knowing who 
is who.  These include deciding whether an individual is a flight risk, 
providing prosecutors with criminal history information before trial, 
deciding the conditions under which a detainee should be housed, notifying 
next of kin in the event of the death or serious illness of an arrestee, 
supplying judges or jurors with relevant information during the guilt or 
sentencing phases of a criminal trial, and giving employers and others data 
on whom they might hire for sensitive positions.195  Authentication, as we 
saw, was the principal, original motivation for taking bodily measurements, 
and soon thereafter, fingerprints of arrestees.196 
At first blush, it might seem as if the same cannot be said of DNA 
samples.  Dismissing the government’s analogy of DNA sampling to 
fingerprint collection as “pure folly,” the United States v. Mitchell district court 
wrote 
[F]ingerprints already provide an unequivocal, and in some respects, a 
better record of personal identity than forensic DNA typing.  
Monozygotic twins, for example, can be distinguished by their 
fingerprints, but not by their DNA. . . . The only reasonable use of DNA 
is investigative, it is not an identification science[,] it is an information 
science.  The identification issue in this instance is a red herring, as there 
is no compelling reason to require a DNA sample in order to “identify” 
an arrestee.197 
The Maryland Court of Appeals took the same position in King v. State, when 
it insisted that “identification is not what King’s DNA sample was used for or 
needed [for] . . . . Solving cold cases . . . was the only State interest served by 
the collection of his DNA.”198 
This is a fair point with respect to the status quo, but an interest need 
not be “compelling” to be cognizable.  Several circuits have noted that a 
determined criminal can alter his appearance and fingerprints to disguise 
his identity.199  The Constitution does not lock the state into a single system 
 
195 See supra Part I.A. 
196 See supra Part III. 
197 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608–09 (footnote omitted). 
198 42 A.3d 549, 578 (Md. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 
(2012). 
199 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 414; Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992).  The King 
court responded by leaving the door to DNA sampling open for “conceivable, albeit 
somewhat unlikely, scenarios where an arrestee may have altered his or her fingerprints 
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for authentication.  Given the inherent limitations of identifiers like driver’s 
licenses, a more secure system for establishing personal identity would 
involve multiple modes of on-the-spot biometric authentication.  Police 
already are experimenting with portable fingerprint scanners to “cut 
through nonsense on the street when suspects try to stall cops by using a 
seemingly endless string of aliases” and “to identify the dead at homicide 
and accident scenes.”200  But “lights-out” AFIS searches do not yet work for 
latent prints.201  In the not-so-distant future, portable devices for STR analysis 
should be operational.202  At that point, Mitchell’s red herring could be 
replaced by a different kettle of fish.203  Including DNA profiling in a 
combination of biometrics for authentication might or might not be a good 
use of resources,204 but this is not something a court should decide.  The 
marginal benefit of DNA profiling is not compelling, but neither is it zero.  
DNA profiling and fingerprinting are not mutually exclusive. 
B.  The Intelligence Interest During and After the Pretrial Period 
Courts are quick to describe the government’s interests in using DNA 
databases to associate individuals with crime scene samples as “undeniably 
compelling” if not “monumental.”205  Killers who left piles of bodies behind 
 
or facial features (making difficult or doubtful identification through comparison to 
earlier fingerprints or photographs on record).”  King, 42 A.3d at 580. 
200 Rocco Parascandola, NYPD Gets High-Tech Upgrade with New Portable Fingerprint Scanner, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 18, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-high-tech-
upgrade-new-portable-fingerprint-scanner-article-1.441512. 
201 A “lights-out” search is one that involves no human interpretation.  Moses, supra note 14, 
at 6-10 n.4, 6-20. 
202 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae National District Attorneys Association in Support of 
Petitioner at 20, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-207) (“Three companies 
have produced and are beginning to market Rapid DNA machines . . . .”); Andrew J. 
Hopwood et al., Integrated Microfluidic System for Rapid Forensic DNA Analysis:  Sample 
Collection to DNA Profile, 82 ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY 6991 (2010) (describing an instrument 
that could conduct STR DNA analysis in a police station); Cedric Hurth et al., An 
Automated Instrument for Human STR Identification:  Design, Characterization, and Experimental 
Validation, 31 ELECTROPHORESIS 3510 (2010) (describing a small instrument for 
performing DNA analysis cheaply and quickly). 
203 Much of the questioning at the oral argument in King was devoted to this possibility.  See 
David H. Kaye, The Oral Argument in Maryland v. King—Part II, FORENSIC SCI., 
STATISTICS, AND THE LAW (Mar. 3, 2013), http://for-sci-law-now.blogspot.com/
2013/03/the-oral-argument-in-maryland-v-king_3.html. 
204 See Brief of Amici Curiae 14 Scholars of Forensic Evidence in Support of Respondent, 
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-207) (arguing in part that DNA-BC is 
ineffective and undesirable). 
205 United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1222 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. 
Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 949 (9th Cir. 2007)), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(en banc).  During the oral argument in King, Justice Alito declared that “this is perhaps 
the most important criminal procedure case that this Court has heard in decades. . . . 
[T]his is what is at stake:  Lots of murders, lots of rapes that can be—that can be solved 
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them and eluded investigators for decades have been apprehended as a 
result of database trawls.206  DNA evidence now produces revelations in 
crimes for which it was once thought to be useless.207  In one case, a dead 
mosquito in a stolen car led police to the suspected thief.208  In the 
fingerprinting arena, “cold hits” began as early at 1902.209  Today, they are 
ubiquitous,210 and the FBI gives a Latent Hit of the Year award to one lucky 
examiner and posts a video about it on its website.211 
Merely praising the power of high-tech fingerprint and DNA databases to 
help police crack tough cases, however, does not define the precise value of 
arrestee sampling.  The more focused question is the government’s interests 
in collecting a DNA sample soon after an arrest “rather than after a person’s 
conviction”212 or possibly not at all (for systems that retain the arrest records 
with or without conviction).  With regard to promptly linking an arrestee to 
an unsolved case, the Pool panel reasoned that “the government’s interests 
remain substantial” because 
There is usually a lengthy period of time between an initial 
determination of probable cause and a person’s trial (and even more 
time before a conviction becomes final after an unsuccessful appeal).  
During this period of time, the government has an interest in 
determining whether the individual may be released pending trial 
without endangering society and ensuring that he or she complies with 
the conditions of his or her release.  The collection of a DNA sample 
allows the government to ensure that the defendant did not commit 
 
using this new technology that involves a very minimal intrusion on personal privacy.”  
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 35. 
206 E.g., ANN RULE, GREEN RIVER, RUNNING RED:  THE REAL STORY OF THE GREEN RIVER 
KILLER—AMERICA’S DEADLIEST SERIAL MURDERER 343, 360 (2004); Andrew Blankstein & 
Joel Rubin, Grim Sleeper Suspect’s Photos of Women Released, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010, 
available at  http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/17/local/la-me-grim-sleeper-
20101217; Ruben Vives, San Francisco Police Link ‘Night Stalker’ Richard Ramirez to Girl’s 1984 
Slaying, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/
2009/oct/23/local/me-richard-ramirez23.  See supra Part I.C. 
207 E.g., Shaila K. Dewan, As Police Extend Use of DNA, A Smudge Could Trap a Thief, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 26, 2004, at A1; Charlie Jannetto, DNA Solves Wider Range of Crimes, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
July 27, 2008, at B1. 
208 Mosquito Helps Police in Stolen Car Investigation, TELEGRAPH, Dec. 22, 2008, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/finland/3902862/Mosquito-
helps-police-in-stolen-car-investigation.html. 
209 See supra Part III.A. 
210 See supra Part I.B. 
211 Latent Hit of the Year Award Videos, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_ 
biometrics/iafis/iafis_latent_hit_of_the_year (last visited July 15, 2011). 
212 United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761 
(9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
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some other crime and discourages a defendant from violating any 
condition of his or her pretrial release.213 
Still more can be said.  During the sometimes lengthy time required for case 
completion, “witnesses can become unavailable or their memories can fade, 
evidence can be lost, and the statute of limitations can run.  Law 
enforcement could be . . . investigating innocent persons . . . .”214  Victims of 
crimes that could have been solved earlier may have to wait additional years 
for closure.215  Exonerations could be delayed.216 
Furthermore, even arrestees who are not successfully charged, or 
defendants who ultimately are acquitted, can be dangerous.  Even if they 
eventually end up in a convicted-offender database, how many people might 
they kill, rape, or rob in the interim?  Although it would be unfair to tarnish 
all arrestees with this broad a brush,217 there are disturbing anecdotes.  The 
man indicted in Los Angeles’s “Grim Sleeper” crimes could have been 
apprehended years earlier—and an untold number of rapes and murders 
prevented—had his arrests prompted DNA profiling.218  Advocates of 
arrestee DNA sampling have produced scores of other examples of 
preventable major crimes.219  Although systematic research would be far 
 
213 Id.  The Third Circuit refuses to count the detection and deterrence of violations of 
pretrial release as a legitimate government interest on the curious ground that “[a]ny 
such interest is outweighed by the presumption of innocence.”  United States v. Mitchell, 
652 F.3d 387, 415 n.25 (3d Cir. 2011).  Normally, the presumption of innocence in 
Anglo-American law is simply “a rule applicable at trial that the burden of proof is on the 
prosecution to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt.”  ANDREW C. 
STUMER, THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE:  EVIDENTIAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
PERSPECTIVES xxxviii (2010).  Thus, the Supreme Court wrote in Bell v. Wolfish, that the 
presumption of innocence “has no application to a determination of the rights of a 
pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has ever begun.”  441 U.S. 520, 533 
(1979).  The European Court of Human Rights has adopted a more expansive view, but 
the addition of a “second, broader facet,” has been criticized as a “vaporous euphemism 
for fairness.”  STUMER, supra, at xxxix (quoting Patrick Healy, Proof and Policy:  No Golden 
Threads, 1987 CRIM. L. REV. 355, 365). 
214 Appellee’s Brief at 41, Haskell v. Brown, No. 10-10-15152 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 2010). 
215 Id. 
216 See Lawrence Mower & Doug McMurdo, Las Vegas Police Reveal DNA Error Put Wrong Man 
in Prison, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, July 8, 2011, available at http://www.lvrj.com/
news/dna-related-error-led-to-wrongful-conviction-in-2001-case-125160484.html (DNA 
database hit producing an exoneration that would not have occurred otherwise). 
217 See United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (invoking “the 
moral polestar of our criminal justice system—the presumption of innocence”). 
218 Gillian Flaccus, ‘Grim Sleeper’ Suspect Had 4-Decade Arrest Record, WASH. TIMES, July 10, 2010, 
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jul/10/grim-sleeper-suspect-
had-4-decade-arrest-record. 
219 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S13756, (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“We 
know from real life examples that an all-arrestee database can prevent many future 
offenses.  In March of this year, the City of Chicago produced a case study of eight serial 
killers in that city who would have been caught after their first offense—rather than after 
their fourth or tenth—if an all-arrestee database had been in place.”); States’ Amicus 
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better than the advocacy reports,220 it is hard to deny that arrestee 
fingerprinting and DNA profiling and databasing (especially if the record 
remains in the database after an acquittal or dismissal) advances—to some 
degree—a compelling government interest. 
C.  A Lesser Intrusion 
Courts usually say two things about the interests of convicted offenders 
or arrestees in avoiding fingerprinting or DNA profiling—that these 
interests are of minor weight,221 and that an arrest or conviction diminishes 
them even further.222  Below, I argue that the former statement is correct 
and that it should prompt the adoption of a categorical exception to the 
warrant requirement for biometric data such as fingerprints and DNA 
profiles.  As a description of the weight of the affected individuals’ interest, 
however, the latter statement betrays a basic confusion.  Prisoners do not 
lose the right to keep officials out of their living quarters because they enter 
prison with a diminished interest in privacy.  Rather, they have a diminished 
expectation because the state has excellent reasons to inspect their cells.223  
Arrestees do not lose any right to keep their fingerprint patterns to 
themselves because they have a reduced interest in secrecy.  Rather, they have 
a reduced expectation because the state has strong reasons to acquire their 
prints.  The language of diminished or reduced expectations is not the 
premise of an argument.  It is the conclusion.224  The phrase does not mean 
that anyone starts out with a weaker interest.  It means that the arrested or 
convicted individual’s interests do not prevail.  To ascertain whether this 
conclusion is correct, we need to give due weight to the interests that 
everyone has in being free from unwanted intrusions.  I therefore examine 
these interests and then show how they support an exception for biometric 
data. 
 
Brief, supra note 190; Ashby Jones, Arrested and Swabbed:  DNA Tests Challenged, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 11, 2011, at A3 (listing similar reports).  But see supra note 19 (describing a limitation 
in these studies). 
220 See supra Part I.B. 
221 E.g., United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The government’s 
interest in building a DNA database for identification purposes . . . outweighs the 
minimal intrusion into a criminal offender’s diminished expectation of privacy.”). 
222 E.g., id. at 177; People v. Garvin, 847 N.E.2d 82, 92 (Ill. 2006). 
223 See, e.g., Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 1992) (Murnaghan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
224 See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 412 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[B]ecause 
DNA profiles developed pursuant to the DNA Act function as ‘genetic fingerprints’ used 
only for identification purposes, arrestees and pretrial detainees have reduced privacy 
interests in the information derived from a DNA sample.”). 
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1.  Freedom of Movement and Physical Intrusion 
Bodies are special.  They are the mind’s interface with and gateway to 
the physical universe.  Fourth Amendment law respects individual claims to 
control entry into the body and to direct its movements.225  Detention of the 
body is a seizure of the person, and entry into it a search.226  However, the 
interest in freedom of movement is largely beside the point when the 
individual already is legitimately in custody.227  A statute might authorize the 
use of force to hold a person still if the individual resists physically,228 but the 
principal seizure of the person lies in the detention of the arrested or 
convicted individual.229  This detention is neither more nor less of an 
infringement of liberty of motion because the state seeks to obtain a 
fingerprint or a DNA sample during the period when it has legal custody of 
the individual.230  As for the intrusiveness of collecting the information, 
fingerprinting requires no entry into the body, and courts are virtually 
unanimous in regarding “the collection of biological samples [for routine 
DNA profiling as] only a minimal intrusion on one’s personal physical 
integrity.”231  In short, with respect to bodily integrity, the analogy between 
 
225 For a detailed discussion of the Court’s cases on what constitutes entry into the body, see 
Kaye, Arrest, supra note 7, at 476–81. 
226 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973). 
227 See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1932) (observing that a search of a 
person and seizure of evidence has long been allowed after a lawful arrest).  When the 
individual is not in custody, this factor has more bearing on the classification.  See Skinner 
v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618 (1989) (indicating that any limitation of a 
person’s freedom of movement necessary to conducting a search must be considered in 
assessing the intrusiveness of the search). 
228 See David H. Kaye, Forceful DNA Collection from Recalcitrant Prisoners, DOUBLE HELIX LAW 
(Apr. 17, 2011, 9:20 AM), http://www.personal.psu.edu/dhk3/blogs/DoubleHelixLaw/
2011/04/forceful-dna-collection-from-recalcitrant-prisoners.html. 
229 Cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (ordering a driver who has already 
been stopped to exit the car is a “de minimis” interference with freedom of movement).  
Even if resort to reasonable force is a separate Fourth Amendment seizure, it is a 
permissible means of executing a search.  See, e.g., Carr v. State, 728 N.E.2d 125, 128–29 
(Ind. 2000) (forcibly anesthetizing a suspect who would not comply with an order for 
taking dental impressions was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); People v. Buza, 
129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), rev. granted, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011) 
(noting the issuance of an order permitting police to use “reasonable force . . . to bring 
defendant . . . into compliance”). 
230 Cf. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (holding that the use of a drug-sniffing 
dog on a car that was legitimately stopped for a traffic offense does not constitute a 
Fourth Amendment “search”). 
231 Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 2004); see also, e.g., Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 
1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995) (“That the gathering of DNA information requires the 
drawing of blood rather than inking and rolling a person’s fingertips does not elevate the 
intrusion upon the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment interests to a level beyond minimal.  
The Supreme Court has noted repeatedly that the drawing of blood constitutes only a 
minimally intrusive search.” (footnote omitted)); State v. O’Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 280 
 
Apr. 2013] ARRESTEE DNA 1135 
 
fingerprinting and DNA sampling is strong.  Neither procedure seriously 
impacts this pair of interests. 
2.  Secrecy and Privacy for Purely Identifying Information 
There are many things we would like to keep secret.  With the possible 
exception of any living saints, many disclosures of information about 
individuals can be harmful to them.  Certainly, most criminals would rather 
not be caught.  They would not want a fingerprint or DNA sample to lead 
police to suspect their involvement in a crime.  By itself, the discovery that 
an individual is (or merely might be) responsible for or involved in a crime 
does not infringe a legitimate interest, let alone an interest that the Fourth 
Amendment respects.232  A bare desire to keep fingerprints or DNA base 
pairs secret deserves no weight in the constitutional calculus.  There is 
something more to be said for a desire to hide one’s true identity and start 
anew, but not enough to produce a significant interest in keeping purely 
identifying data used only for authentication out of government records.233 
A different use of purely identifying data deserves greater attention.  An 
arrestee could complain that forging the link to the crime scene invades the 
distinct interest in keeping one’s whereabouts secret.  A concern with spatial 
privacy seems to sit more comfortably within the Fourth Amendment than 
the desire for freedom from prosecution.  In United States v. Karo,234 for 
example, the Supreme Court held that planting a beeper in a container of 
ether and tracking the container’s movements through houses and other 
locations constituted a search.235  A database trawl of an arrestee’s 
fingerprint or DNA profile might produce a match to a print or DNA sample 
found in the bedroom of a murdered woman, which in turn, might lead to 
the discovery that the arrestee was having an affair with her. 
Nonetheless, database trawling differs from the investigatory technique 
in Karo, and the Supreme Court never has viewed the Fourth Amendment as 
protecting mere information about a person’s locations.  “Staking out” a 
suspect’s residence and “tailing” him gives the police a record of the 
 
(N.J. 2007) (“We harbor no doubt that the taking of a buccal cheek swab is a very minor 
physical intrusion upon the person.”).  The situation for DNA and fingerprints is 
therefore quite different from that for drug testing of urine, for which “the process of 
collecting the sample . . . may in some cases involve visual or aural monitoring of the act 
of urination, [which] itself implicates privacy interests.”  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989). 
232 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (“Obviously, however, a 
‘legitimate’ expectation of privacy by definition means more than a subjective 
expectation of not being discovered.”). 
233 See supra Part I.A (rejecting as implausible the claim to a discontinuous identity). 
234 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
235 Id. at 719. 
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individual’s movements, but that does not make these time-honored 
practices “searches” that trigger Fourth Amendment protections.  Only 
when the government has committed a trespass to a chattel236 or entered—
physically or technologically—spaces cloaked in a reasonable expectation of 
privacy has the Court treated the gathering of intelligence about the 
locations of people or objects as a search.237  Just because police 
investigations establish that individuals visited certain places at certain times 
does not mean that they implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy.  It is 
one thing to place a television monitor in a bedroom, as in Orwell’s 1984, or 
to track the movements of a private car every minute of every day, as in 
United States v. Jones.238  It is another to discover trace evidence that might 
have come from an intruder at one moment in time in a bedroom or a car. 
Significantly, the Court never has recognized the impact of trace 
evidence on momentary spatial privacy as sufficient to constitute a search, let 
alone as the basis for a weighty interest.239  In United States v. Edwards,240 the 
Court, in dealing with paint chips removed from the clothing of an arrestee, 
observed that there was no “doubt that clothing or other belongings may be 
seized upon arrival of the accused at the place of detention and later 
subjected to laboratory analysis or that the test results are admissible at 
 
236 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth 
Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass 
upon the areas . . . it enumerates.”). 
237 See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, No. 11-564, 2013 WL 1196577 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2013) (holding 
that taking a dog, trained to alert to drugs, onto the porch of a house to see if drugs are 
inside is a search); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 34 (2001) (holding that 
thermal-imaging of a home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within 
the home constitutes a search because it can reveal legal and illegal activities within the 
house that would not otherwise have been discovered without entering the premises); 
Karo, 468 U.S. at 714 (holding that monitoring a beeper as it moves through a private 
residence constitutes a search). 
238 132 S. Ct. at 948 (noting that the car was tracked for twenty-eight days). 
239 Four Justices in Jones regarded “long-term monitoring of . . . a person’s movements on 
public streets” as infringing a reasonable expectation of spatial privacy.  Id. at 958 (Alito, 
J., concurring).  The plurality emphasized that “relatively short-term monitoring of a 
person’s movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our 
society has recognized as reasonable.”  Id. at 964.  Justice Sotomayor agreed that it was 
proper to “ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded 
and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at 
will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on” in deciding whether “a 
reasonable societal expectation of privacy” exists for long-term GPS monitoring of a 
vehicle.  Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  For further discussion of this privacy-in-
the-aggregate theory, see Kerr, supra note 130. 
240 415 U.S. 800 (1974). 
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trial.”241  That the laboratory analyses could implicate spatial privacy was of 
no constitutional moment.242 
Thus, the various claims for keeping secret purely identifying 
information that could link an individual to a crime scene are weak.  The 
Court recognized as much in Davis v. Mississippi,243 its leading case on 
fingerprinting.  A woman in Meridian, Mississippi, reported that “a Negro 
youth” broke into her home and raped her.  Police, “without warrants, took 
at least 24 Negro youths,” including Davis, “to police headquarters where 
they were questioned briefly, fingerprinted, and released without charge.”244  
After Davis’s fingerprints were discovered to match those lifted from the 
windowsill, he was indicted, tried, and convicted.245  His objection to the 
admission of the fingerprint evidence was overruled, and the Mississippi 
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on the theory that fingerprint 
evidence is so reliable that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does 
not apply to this evidence.246  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  The Court 
held that the Fourth Amendment requires the exclusion of evidence that is 
the fruit of an unreasonable search or seizure, regardless of how reliable 
that evidence may be.247 
The Court did not state or imply that the acquisition of the prints and 
their subsequent analysis made the procedure unconstitutional.  Reasoning 
that Davis was detained without a warrant and without probable cause, and 
that he was not merely fingerprinted but interrogated, the Court concluded 
that the resulting fingerprints were inadmissible.248  The Court’s view of 
fingerprinting itself was positive.  After establishing that “[d]etentions for 
the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are . . . subject to the constraints 
of the Fourth Amendment,”249 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority of 
the Court, added that 
 
241 Id. at 80304. 
242 One might argue that databases will increase the number of cases in which trace evidence 
implicates spatial privacy to the point where the Court should rethink its Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Cf. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (describing 
how long-term technological monitoring is more problematic under the Fourth 
Amendment than is short-term monitoring).  But larger databases are also more 
productive ones, thus fortifying the government’s claim that the databases advance vital 
interests. 
243 394 U.S. 721 (1969). 
244 Id. at 722. 
245 Id. at 723. 
246 Id. at 72324. 
247 Id. at 724; see also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 81314 (1985) (applying Davis to 
fingerprints acquired by bringing a suspect to the police station without a warrant or 
probable cause). 
248 Davis, 394 U.S. at 72628. 
249 Id. at 721. 
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Detention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less serious intrusion 
upon personal security than other types of police searches and 
detentions.  Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an 
individual’s private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or 
search.  Nor can fingerprint detention be employed repeatedly to harass 
any individual, since the police need only one set of each person’s prints.  
Furthermore, fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and effective 
crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifications or confessions . . . . 
Finally, because there is no danger of destruction of fingerprints, the 
limited detention need not come unexpectedly or at an inconvenient 
time.250 
In this way, the Court opened the door to the possibility that “the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment could be met by narrowly 
circumscribed procedures for obtaining, during the course of a criminal 
investigation, the fingerprints of individuals for whom there is no probable 
cause to arrest.”251  Of course, the Davis dictum, now implemented in 
procedures for ordering suspects to submit to DNA sampling for 
identification,252 still requires at least some individualized suspicion and 
judicial review—but only because of the compelled appearance of the 
suspect.  When the appearance occurs pursuant to grand jury subpoena, 
neither the compulsion to be present253 nor the cooperation necessary to 
acquire a voice exemplar254 or a handwriting sample255 is considered a search 
or seizure.  When the appearance is the result of a valid arrest, based on 
probable cause—as it is for arrestee fingerprinting and DNA sampling—the 
only Fourth Amendment barrier recognized in Davis dissolves.256 
 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 728. 
252 See, e.g., In re Nontestimonial Identification Order Directed to R.H., 762 A.2d 1239, 1240 
(Vt. 2000) (upholding as constitutional “a nontestimonial identification order that 
required [a suspect] to submit to the collection of cheek epithelial cells” on a showing of 
reasonable suspicion); Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 50, at 42122 (describing statutes 
and court rules requiring suspects to supply physical evidence on a showing of reasonable 
suspicion that are “broad enough to apply to DNA samples”). 
253 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (“[A] subpoena to appear before a grand 
jury is not a ‘seizure’ in the Fourth Amendment sense . . . .”). 
254 See id. at 15 (“[N]either the summons to appear before the grand jury nor its directive to 
make a voice recording infringed upon any interest protected by the Fourth 
Amendment . . . .”). 
255 See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 22 (1973) (“The specific and narrowly drawn 
directive requiring the witness to furnish a specimen of his handwriting violated no 
legitimate Fourth Amendment interest.” (footnote omitted)). 
256 The Court made this crystal clear in Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 29495 (1973) (noting 
that the respondent’s detention was constitutional because the police had probable 
cause, and thus  “[t]he vice of the detention in Davis is therefore absent”), and Dionisio, 
410 U.S. at 11 (“[I]n Davis it was the initial seizure—the lawless dragnet detention—that 
violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, not the taking of the 
fingerprints . . . . Davis is plainly inapposite to a case where the initial restraint does not 
itself infringe the Fourth Amendment.”).  In Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 
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The Court’s cases on biometric data thus reveal a perception that the 
noninvasive acquisition and analysis of purely biometric information carries 
with it a greatly diminished expectation of privacy.257  The intrusion on 
Fourth Amendment interests is significantly less than in the usual types of 
searches and seizures. 
D.  The Biometric Exception Defined 
Combining the lesser intrusion associated with biometric searches with 
the government’s substantial authentication and intelligence interests in 
having the biometric data makes the case for the biometric exception 
complete.  It should be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to 
acquire, analyze, store, and trawl biometric data without a warrant and 
without individualized suspicion when five conditions hold:  (1) the person 
legitimately is detained (or the data are acquired without confining the 
individual); (2) the process of collecting the data is not physically or 
mentally invasive; (3) collection proceeds according to rules that prevent 
arbitrary selection of individuals; (4) the biometric data are used only to 
establish or authenticate the true identity of a given individual or to link 
individuals to crime scenes; and (5) the authentication or intelligence-
gathering system is valid, reliable, and effective. 
Condition (1) ensures that the interest in freedom of movement is not 
compromised.  Condition (2) precludes intimate bodily invasions.  
Condition (3) removes one of the reasons for interposing a judicial 
magistrate between the police and the target of a search or seizure.258  
 
2012), however, Judge Fletcher read Davis and a related case, Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 
811 (1985), for the proposition that “fingerprints may not be taken from an arrestee 
solely for an investigative purpose, absent a warrant or reasonable suspicion that the 
fingerprints would help solve the crime for which he was taken into custody.”  Id. at 1066 
(Fletcher, J., dissenting), reh’g en banc granted and opinions vacated, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 
2012).  This characterization overlooks both the facts and the reasoning of the Court’s 
opinions.  See Kaye, Drawing Lines, supra note 29, at 17. 
257 See Kaye, Drawing Lines, supra note 29 at 1517; see also Kaye, Arrest, supra note 7, at 
47376. 
258 If non-intimate biometric measurements are taken on all individuals who are detained for 
a given offense, and if individualized evidence is not needed to justify acquiring the 
biometric information, then, a judicial magistrate is not required to review the police 
officer’s judgment on a case-by-case basis.  In special-needs cases with these features, the 
Court has dispensed with the warrant process.  See Kaye, Arrest, supra note 7 at 483507.  
Outside of the special-needs area, the Supreme Court has been insensitive to bad faith or 
pretextual searches and seizures that are objectively justifiable.  See Kentucky v. King, 131 
S. Ct. 1849, 185659 (2011) (using an objective standard even when examining police-
created exigent circumstances); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (holding 
that “special-needs and administrative-inspection cases are unusual in their concern for 
pretext,” and that in all other cases, “the law demands that we look to whether the arrest 
is objectively justified, rather than to the motive of the arresting officer”); Atwater v. City 
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Conditions (4) and (5) indicate that the government’s interest in acting is 
substantial.  When these circumstances are satisfied, harms to individuals 
(outside of the prospect of criminal prosecution based on adequate 
evidence) and the benefits of judicial review are minor or atypical; hence, 
the balance between individual privacy and government interests routinely 
points to the reasonableness of the collection and use of the identifying data 
either to authenticate a person’s identity or to obtain investigative leads.  A 
categorical exception to the warrant requirement therefore is appropriate.259 
However, even if the categorical exception for biometric data acquisition 
and use offers the least dangerous and most logical route to upholding a law 
enforcement database system, it is not a Proceed-Directly-to-Go card for 
AFIS or CODIS databases.  For the exception to apply to these systems, the 
information content of fingerprints and DNA samples and profiles must be 
effectively limited to indicia of identity.  Only then will the interests that 
individuals have in withholding the information be tissue thin.  If the 
biometric data were used to infer thought processes or to uncover socially 
sensitive information, then condition (4) would not hold.  To the extent 
that a biometric database houses such sensitive information, its existence 
poses a risk that it will be used for something other than authentication and 
developing leads to investigate. 
Opponents of DNA-BC maintain that whereas ordinary fingerprints can 
reveal nothing but randomness in the uterine environment, DNA profiles 
may prove to contain individual health-related information, and DNA 
samples already do.260  In fact, some critics claim that the DNA variations 
 
of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 34647 (2001) (explaining that courts do not typically 
evaluate the police officer’s subjective judgment at the time of the arrest and instead 
apply an objective reasonableness standard); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 
(1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth 
Amendment analysis.”). 
259 In opposition to this proposal, it has been said that 
  the Court has not created a new exception to the Fourth Amendment in decades, 
and would likely do so now with great hesitation.  The Supreme Court has never 
approved a suspicionless search involving bodily intrusion for a law enforcement 
purpose, and to do so here would be a substantial departure from traditional Fourth 
Amendment principles. 
  Sandra J. Carnahan, The Supreme Court’s Primary Purpose Test:  A Roadblock to the National 
Law Enforcement DNA Database, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1, 35 (2004) (footnote omitted).  But 
regardless of whether the Court would hesitate or seize on the exception described here, 
the proposal is faithful to traditional Fourth Amendment principles.  It is responsive to 
the interest in freedom from bodily intrusion.  The biometric information itself also is 
not severely threatening to individual interests in informational privacy.  A clear and 
candid exception is less of a departure from traditional Fourth Amendment principles 
than is naked totality balancing, and it is more direct than special-needs balancing for 
intelligence databases. 
260 E.g., Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2012) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) 
(“[U]nlike DNA, a fingerprint says nothing about the person’s health, their propensity 
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used for identification already are “medically relevant,” being “predictive of 
medically important genes” and “disrupt[ing] the way that genes are 
supposed to work, thereby causing disease.”261 
On this view, it would seem that fingerprinting qualifies for the 
biometric exception, but DNA sampling does not.  But Part V shows that this 
view is oversimplified.  It explains that DNA identification profiles are not 
known to include disease-causing mutations or to be currently useful to 
police, employers, or insurers who, it is said, might want genetic test results 
from the DNA of suspected or convicted offenders.  Conceivably, however, 
determined officials could mine both fingerprints and DNA for more 
sensitive information than they do now.  Under the biometric exception, the 
crucial question for both fingerprint and DNA databases then becomes 
whether courts should trust the government to extract only the identifying 
information.  The answer, as discussed below, depends on the inherent or 
legally mandated safeguards in the system.  
V.  THE BIOMETRIC EXCEPTION APPLIED 
A.  Fingerprints 
The perception that fingerprints are nothing more than random marks 
for differentiating among individuals is cultural, not scientific.262  Friction 
ridge skin develops in the fetus in response to genetics (largely determining 
the overall ridge or pattern classification) and chaotic stresses (producing 
minutiae in the path followed by particular ridges).263  Therefore, some 
features are similar between siblings, especially identical twins, whereas the 
details of minutiae are random.264  A serious medical literature exists on 
correlations between abnormal features in friction ridge skin and 
 
for particular disease, their race and gender characteristics, and perhaps even their 
propensity for certain conduct.” (quoting United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 n.3 
(9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Gould, J. concurring))); Barry Steinhardt, Privacy and Forensic 
DNA Data Banks, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:  THE TECHNOLOGY OF 
JUSTICE 173, 173 (David Lazer ed., 2004). 
261 Adam Schwartz, Senior Staff Counsel, ACLU of Illinois, Address at the Symposium on 
Familial DNA Searching, Center on Wrongful Convictions, Northwestern University 
School of Law:  DNA Familial Testing:  Civil Liberties and Civil Rights Concerns, at 2 
(Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Speech-
DNA-familial-testing.pdf. 
262 See Cole, SUSPECT IDENTITIES, supra note 149, at 11718; COLE, Fingerprint Identification, 
supra note 188, at 77. 
263 R. Austin Hicklin, Anatomy of Friction Ridge Skin, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOMETRICS 23, 26 
(Stan Z. Li ed., 2009). 
264 Id. at 27; see also Sarah B. Holt, Quantitative Genetics of Fingerprint Patterns, 17 BRIT. MED. 
BULL. 247 (1961). 
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schizophrenia,265 Alzheimer’s,266 chromosome abnormalities,267 diabetes,268 
leukemia,269 thalassemia,270 and other diseases or conditions.271  This is not to 
say that finger or palm prints are valid indicators of any of these conditions, 
especially by themselves,272 but it does mean that medical researchers can 
find correlations between different traits that are influenced by common 
causes such as a disturbance in embryonic development.273 
Nevertheless, that fingerprint data from arrestees can have genetic and 
medical significance does not make it a meaningful threat to privacy.  The 
correlations may be so weak and nonspecific as to make the features 
worthless predictors of clinical conditions or predispositions.  Moreover, 
conditions such as major birth defects may be apparent to police and the 
public in any event.  The specter of a fingerprint database being used to 
determine the medical status or predispositions of arrestees is just that—an 
apparition with little substance.  Fingerprinting on arrest satisfies the 
biometric exception to the warrant requirement. 
B.  DNA Profiles 
The situation for a database of DNA profiles is more complex but 
roughly similar.  For practical purposes, “the DNA profile derived from the 
defendant’s blood sample establishes only a record of the defendant’s 
 
265 E.g., Brendan D. Kelly et al., Neurological Soft Signs and Dermatoglyphic Anomalies in Twins 
with Schizophrenia, 19 EUR. PSYCH. 159, 161 (2004); Araceli Rosa et al., Further Evidence that 
Congenital Dermatoglyphic Abnormalities Are Associated with Psychosis:  A Twin Study, 28 
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 697, 697 (2002); C.J. van Oel et al., Differentiating Between Low And 
High Susceptibility To Schizophrenia In Twins:  The Significance of Dermatoglyphic Indices in 
Relation to Other Determinants of Brain Development, 52 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 181, 190–91 
(2001). 
266 E.g., Herman J. Weinreb, Fingerprint Patterns in Alzheimer’s Disease, 42 ARCHIVES OF 
NEUROLOGY 50 (1985). 
267 E.g., Terry Reed, Review:  Dermatoglyphics in Medicine—Problems and Use in Suspected 
Chromosome Abnormalities, 8 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 411, 418–24 (1981). 
268 See, e.g., Henry S. Kahn et al., A Fingerprint Marker from Early Gestation Associated with 
Diabetes in Middle Age:  The Dutch Hunger Winter Families Study, 38 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 
101 (2009). 
269 Mario Joseph Bukelo et al., Palmar Dermatoglyphics in Children with Acute Lymphoblastic 
Leukemia—A Preliminary Investigation, 18 J. FORENSIC LEGAL MED. 115 (2011). 
270 Asena C. Dogramaci et al., Dermatoglyphs in Patients with Beta-Thalassemia Major and Their 
Thalassemia Carrier Parents, 33 COLLEGIUM ANTROPOLOGICUM 607 (2009). 
271 See e.g., Emily S. Todd et al., Characterization of Dermatoglyphics in PHOX2B-confirmed 
Congenital Central Hypoventilation Syndrome, 118 PEDIATRICS e408 (2006). 
272 See, e.g., Reed, supra note 267; Julian Verbov, Clinical Significance and Genetics of Epidermal 
Ridges—A Review of Dermatoglyphics, 54 J. INVESTIGATIVE DERMATOLOGY 261 (1970). 
273 See, e.g., Blanka A. Schaumann & John M. Opitz, Clinical Aspects of Dermatoglyphics, 27 
BIRTH DEFECTS:  ORIGINAL ARTICLES SERIES 193 (1991). 
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identity”274—at least, for now, and with the caveat that this record is 
inherited and therefore can be used for parentage testing when the profiles 
of possible parents also are known.  This section explains these conclusions.  
It introduces the terminology and basic ideas about the nature and 
operation of human genes, describes what is known about the locations and 
properties of the DNA sequences used in Combined DNA Index System 
(“CODIS”) databases, and notes the limitations on this knowledge. 
1.  The Genetics of CODIS Profiles275 
A CODIS profile is basically a set of thirteen pairs of arbitrary 
numbers.276  Each pair comes from a particular location (a “locus”) on the 
pair of chromosomes that we normally inherit from our two parents.  The 
numbers stand for the number of back-to-back copies of short DNA 
sequences called short tandem repeats (“STRs”).  STRs resemble freight 
trains with different numbers of box cars—the more box cars, the longer the 
STR train.  Each different number of box-car-like repeats is called an 
“allele.”  The D5S818 locus, for example, is a place on chromosome 5 where 
people have an ATAG repeat.  The most common such alleles are 11, 12, 
and 13; they make up over 85% of the alleles found in most major 
population groups in America.277  A man with eleven repeats on one copy of 
chromosome 5 and thirteen repeats on his other copy would have the type 
(11, 13)—meaning that he inherited the sequence (ATAG)1l from one 
 
274 People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55, 65 (Cal. 2010) (quoting United States v. Kincade, 379 
F.3d 813, 837 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (plurality opinion)). 
275 Most of the material in this section is drawn without further attribution from the Brief of 
Genetics, Genomics, and Forensic Science Researchers as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Scientists’ Brief], cert. 
granted, No. 12-207, (U.S. Dec. 28, 2012), written by the author of this article, Hank 
Greely, and “physicians, human geneticists, statistical geneticists, molecular biologists, or 
other researchers in human genetics or forensic science” who include “members of the 
Institute of Medicine, of committees of the National Academy of Sciences and the 
National Institutes of Health, and [of] the editorial boards of numerous genetics 
journals.”  Id. at 1.  For more detail on the biology and biochemistry of genes, see, for 
example, JOCELYN E. KREBS ET AL., LEWIN’S ESSENTIAL GENES (3d ed. 2013), and JAMES D. 
WATSON ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE (6th ed. 2008).  Nontechnical 
presentations tailored to forensic genetics include DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX 
AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2010), and David H. Kaye & George Sensabaugh, Reference 
Guide on DNA Identification Evidence, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 129, 
129210 (3d ed. 2011). 
276 To cope with the growing size of the national DNA database (NDIS) and to achieve more 
compatibility with the databases of other countries, the FBI is considering adding more 
components to the profiles.  Douglas R. Hares, Letter to the Editor, Expanding the CODIS 
Core Loci in the United States, 6 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L:  GENETICS e52, e52 (2012). 
277 John M. Butler et al., Allele Frequencies for 15 Autosomal STR Loci on U.S. Caucasian, African 
American, and Hispanic Populations, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1 (2003). 
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parent and (ATAG)13 from the other parent.
278  All the CODIS STRs have 
repeat units like ATAG, that are four “letters” (nucleotide bases) long, 
making them “tetranucleotide repeats,” or “tetramers.”  The complete set of 
twenty-six numbers specifying how many tetramers are present at each locus 
is the man’s CODIS profile. 
For each locus, there is a range of repeat numbers observed in any 
population.  These variations (“polymorphisms”) result from the fact that 
the molecule that copies DNA prior to cell division sometimes skips a repeat 
unit or replicates the same unit  twice.279  In particular, a sperm or egg cell 
can have a different number of repeats at a locus than the father or mother 
inherited from their parents.  This cell can result in a child with a novel 
number of repeats.  This does not happen frequently, but over the 
generations, these new alleles can spread through the population.  How 
quickly and to what extent a new allele establishes itself depends on the 
reproductive fitness of the individuals who carry it.  If an allele is deleterious, 
natural selection tends to prevent it from spreading and becoming a 
permanent or major part of the population’s gene pool.  The CODIS loci 
were selected from the many STRs scattered across the human genome in 
part because they have common alleles in all the major U.S. population 
groups and were not known to have any substantial disease associations in 
these populations.  That is, they represent common, normal human 
variation. 
Genes are DNA sequences that are “expressed” as proteins or as 
ribonucleic acid (“RNA”), a single-stranded molecule that is similar to DNA.  
In the first major step of the expression of proteins, the sequence 
information in “exons” and “introns” is copied into “precursor messenger 
RNA” (“pre-mRNA”).  In the second major step, this pre-mRNA is modified 
at its ends, and parts that were copied from the “introns” of the gene are cut 
away (“spliced”).  This processing of the pre-mRNA reduces the size of the 
transcript (often dramatically), protects it from being degraded, and 
facilitates its transportation from the cell nucleus to structures known as 
“ribosomes.”  In the third step, the mature mRNA, having moved to the 
ribosomes, is “translated” into a protein product.  Because the sequence 
information in the gene’s exons determines the mRNA sequence, and the 
mRNA sequence determines the structure of the protein, the gene is said to 
“encode” the protein. 
In addition to the exons and introns, the gene has untranslated regions 
(“UTRs”) before the first exon and after the last one.  These UTRs contain 
 
278 (ATAG)n denotes n ATAG repeats. For instance, (ATAG)5 is (ATAG)(ATAG)(ATAG)
(ATAG)(ATAG). 
279 KREBS ET AL., supra note 275, at 24 (describing the result as “slippery sequence[s]”). 
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regulatory information about initiating and sometimes terminating 
transcription as well as splicing.  Genes often are defined as the sequence 
from the leading UTR, through the exons and introns, and ending with the 
trailing UTR.280  Outside this region, in the “intergenic” spaces between 
genes, are “promoters,” “silencers,” and “enhancers” that help turn genes on 
and off or modulate the quantity of the proteins or RNAs that the genes 
encode.  In addition, the intergenic DNA includes apparently nonfunctional 
gene fragments, pseudogenes, and transposable elements that can move 
from one place in the genome to another (usually leaving the original copy 
behind). 
STRs can be located inside—or outside—of genes and intergenic 
regulatory elements.  Because only three-letter “words” comprise the genetic 
code that translates mRNA to protein, even a difference of a single four-
letter tetramer within an exon could have a dramatic effect on the structure 
of the protein product.  What consequence, if any, this difference would 
have on the health or other traits of an individual is a further question,281 
but not one that need be resolved here, for the CODIS loci all lie outside of 
exons.  Thus, they are not transcribed into stable mRNA (nor are they 
known to be transcribed into smaller RNAs that regulate transcription and 
translation).  They also lie outside of UTRs and promoters.  And, they are 
not known to interfere with silencers or enhancers.282  Although this is not 
the end of the story, and there are other mechanisms by which the CODIS 
STRs could regulate gene expression or be coincidental markers for diseases 
or traits, these facts exclude several obvious ways in which the CODIS alleles 
could be the basis for inferring a person’s present or future health. 
2.  “Considerable Current Debate?” 
Judicial and other ink has been spent trying to make it appear that 
CODIS STRs have some deep biological function that surely will turn them 
into a source of highly personal and sensitive medical information.  Judges 
in the Ninth Circuit have suggested that the accidental repeat units “contain 
useful genetic programming material.”283  Four judges in United States v. 
Kincade worried that “extensive information can, or potentially could, be 
 
280 See, e.g., id. at 9798.  The ideal definition of a gene is the subject of vigorous debate. 
281 Less disruptive triplet STRs within some of these regions are known to cause diseases, as 
are some triplet STRs found within UTRs and promoters.  The total lengths of these 
triplet expansions lie well above the length range for CODIS STR polymorphisms.  See, 
e.g., Albert R. La Spada & J. Paul Taylor, Repeat Expansion Disease:  Progress and Puzzles in 
Disease Pathogenesis, 11 NATURE REV. GENETICS 247 (2010). 
282 However, the locations of all these regulatory elements have yet to be ascertained. 
283 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (plurality 
opinion). 
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gleaned from . . . even the ‘junk’ DNA currently used.”284  These judges 
chastised the majority of the en banc court in this DNA-AC case for not 
recognizing that “[t]he DNA ‘fingerprint’ entered into CODIS likely has the 
potential to reveal information about an individual’s ‘genetic defects, 
predispositions to diseases, and perhaps even sexual orientation.’”285  These 
judges also accepted at face value the prediction “that the DNA profiles 
entered into CODIS will someday be able to predict the likelihood that a 
given individual will engage in certain types of criminal, or non-criminal but 
perhaps socially disfavored, behavior.”286  A similar perception apparently 
underlies the district court’s claim in United States v. Mitchell that “even 
though the taking of a sample may not be unreasonably intrusive, the search 
of the sample is quite intrusive, severely affecting Mitchell’s expectation of 
privacy in his most intimate matters.”287  The Maryland Court of Appeals in 
King was more circumspect, only claiming that there is “considerable current 
debate as to whether these ‘non-coding’ or ‘junk’ DNA provide no 
predictive genetic information.”288 
However, the “considerable current debate” has more to do with 
projections for the future than with any current reality.  That debate consists 
of a flurry of law review essays written six or seven years ago.289  First, 
Professor Elizabeth Joh wrote in 2006 that DNA samples might be used to 
lock people up on the basis of tests for a “crime gene,”290 that “markers now 
thought to be meaningless may be (and have been) found to contain 
predictive medical information,”291 that all military personnel were having 
their DNA placed in a CODIS database,292 and that shed or “abandoned” 
DNA “is a backdoor to population-wide data banking.”293  Second, I wrote a 
 
284 Id. at 842 (Gould, J., concurring). 
285 Id. at 850 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
286 Id. 
287 United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 609 (W.D. Pa. 2009); see also People v. 
Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), rev. granted, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011). 
288 King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 560 n.17 (Md. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Maryland v. King, 
133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
289 The treatise, 4 David L. Faigman et al., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:  THE LAW AND 
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 31:4, at 124 (2012), refers to “continued debates,” 
although it cites no scholarship continuing the debate after 2007. 
290 Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA:  The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 
100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 876–77 (2006). 
291 Id. at 870. 
292 Id. at 879.  In reality, the only way the military samples can be analyzed in a criminal 
investigation is pursuant to court order in “an investigation or prosecution of a felony, or 
any sexual offense, for which no other source of DNA information is reasonably 
available.”  10 U.S.C. § 1565a (2006).  The only way military samples can get into a federal 
database is through convictions (and as of January 2006, arrests) of specific soldiers for 
“qualifying military offense[s].”  10 U.S.C. § 1565. 
293 Joh, supra note 290, at 874. 
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short corrective essay dismissing these scenarios as “science fiction.”294  With 
regard to health predictions from the CODIS profiles, I argued that the 
news articles on “junk DNA” that Professor Joh cited did not support her 
position that CODIS STRs were or were about to become valuable in clinical 
medicine or genetic counseling. 
This exchange caught the eye of a professor of criminology, Simon Cole.  
In an essay on “Junk DNA”295 maintaining that the previous essays were 
oversimplified, Professor Cole rediscovered a point I had emphasized years 
earlier—that even if a particular allele does not cause a genetic disease or 
influence an observable trait, it could be associated with one.296  Going far 
beyond this theoretical possibility, however, Professor Cole insisted that 
“some forensic STRs are already predictive . . . of disease, and more may 
ultimately turn out to be.”297 
Professor Cole’s treatment of the genetics literature prompted a fourth 
essay in this series.298  In an analysis of the underlying relationships that 
might permit predictions to be made, I tried to show that no CODIS locus 
had been shown to be a useful predictor of health status and that even with 
our advancing understanding of the mechanisms of gene expression and 
regulation, it was unlikely that police, database administrators, employers, or 
insurers soon would be able to look at a CODIS profile and make a 
reasonable prediction about the individual’s present or future health.299  At 
that point, the “academic debate”300 closed with a whimper.301 
 
294 Kaye, Science Fiction, supra note 62, at 62–63.  For a more extended assessment of the 
prospects for finding a crime gene, see David H. Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research and 
Criminal DNA Databases, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 259 (2006) [hereinafter Kaye, 
Behavioral Genetics Research]. 
295 Simon A. Cole, Is the “Junk” DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 54, 61–
62 (2007). 
296 David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 
179, 187 (2001) (“[S]ome noncoding loci can indicate or predict disease states, and all 
loci, coding and noncoding alike, can be used for parentage testing.”). 
297 Cole, supra note 295, at 59 (emphasis changed from original). 
298 David H. Kaye, Please, Let’s Bury the Junk:  The CODIS Loci and the Revelation of Private 
Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70 (2007). 
299 Id. at 72–79.  Professor Cole’s impression to the contrary, it seems, was based on 
misreading words such as “linkage” and “loss of heterozygosity” in John M. Butler, Genetics 
and Genomics of Core Short Tandem Repeat Loci Used in Human Identity Testing, 51 J. FORENSIC 
SCI. 253, 260 (2006); see also Schwartz, supra note 261, at 9 n.2 (misconstruing the same 
article).  The article’s author, a chemist at the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, describes the entire debate as “really a non-issue,” JOHN M. BUTLER, 
ADVANCED TOPICS IN FORENSIC DNA TYPING 226 (2011), prompted by “a 
misunderstanding by Simon Cole over some of the things I had written in a review article 
on STR markers.”  Id. at 228. 
300 King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 560 n.17 (Md. 2012), cert. granted sub nom.  Maryland v. King, 
No. 12-207 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012). 
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3.  Into the Unknown 
Today, after some twenty years of research using CODIS loci and other 
STRs as possible markers for disease-causing variations in genes, no 
correlations that would allow valid predictions from the identification 
profiles have emerged.  To be sure, there have been a few reports of some 
associations in some families or populations, but these associations have not 
been consistently replicated and shown to be applicable to the populations 
represented in U.S. databases.302  To the contrary, the most recent published 
review concludes: 
The . . . standard and recommended CODIS panels of STR 
loci . . . continue to be of limited significance for assessing 
phenotypes. . . . Several . . . overlay predicted sites for genomic 
regulation, but there is no evidence that any particular repeat [is] 
indicative of phenotype.  The utility of the CODIS profile itself, even in 
light of the significance of various epigenetic effects and roles of 
noncoding RNAs, is limited to identification purposes at this time.303 
But “at this time” does not mean “for all time,” and some advocates and 
legal scholars believe that recent discoveries regarding the complex system 
of gene regulation sound a death knell304—or at least a note of caution305—
 
301 See Simon A. Cole, Coming Clean About “Junk DNA,” 102 NW. L. REV. COLLOQUY 107, 107 
(2007) (“I agree that the recent exchange . . . has probably beaten the ‘junk DNA’ horse 
past the point of expiration.  One thing we all agree upon is that the potential privacy 
violations engendered by the storage of forensic DNA profiles in law enforcement 
databases is a ‘distraction’ . . . from the potential privacy issues posed by the storage of 
DNA samples in law enforcement and other government repositories.”); David H. Kaye, 
Mopping Up After Coming Clean About “Junk DNA”, Nov. 27, 2007 [hereinafter Mopping 
Up], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1032094. 
302 Scientists’ Brief, supra note 275, at 23–24; see also infra text accompanying note 309.  The 
reader of only law review notes and treatises would not know this.  See, e.g., Faigman et al., 
supra note 289; H. Brendan Burke, Note, A “Special Need” for Change:  Fourth Amendment 
Problems and Solutions Regarding DNA Databanking, 34 STETSON L. REV. 161, 165 (2004) 
(“[J]unk DNA police use can also predict the subject’s susceptibility to diabetes.”); Ashley 
Eiler, Note, Arrested Development:  Reforming the Federal All-Arrestee DNA Collection Statute to 
Comply with the Fourth Amendment, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1201, 1211 (2011) (“[J]unk DNA 
is increasingly considered to contain predictive medical and behavioral information.”); 
Jill C. Schaefer, Note, Profiling at the Cellular Level:  The Future of the New York State DNA 
Databanks, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 559, 577–78 (2004) (“A few years ago British scientists 
were able to find markers of susceptibility of type-one diabetes from Junk DNA.”). 
303 Sara H. Katsanis & Jennifer K. Wagner, Characterization of the Standard and Recommended 
CODIS Markers, 58 J. FORENSIC SCI. S169 (2013). 
304 New Research on “Junk” DNA Raises Questions on Eve of Crucial Court Hearing, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Sept. 11, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/09/new-research-on-junk-
dna-raises-questions (“[R]esearch . . . confirms for the first time that over 80% of our 
DNA that was once thought to have no function, actually plays a critical role in 
controlling how our cells, tissue and organs behave . . . . [T]he ENCODE research 
reinforces the points we’ve made multiple times before—that DNA—whether it is in the 
form of a full genetic sample or an extracted profile—can reveal an extraordinary 
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for continued assurances that CODIS profiles are not powerfully predictive.  
Caution about the future is wise, as the chicken discovered when the farmer 
who invariably had fed her every morning arrived the next day to wring her 
neck.306  A deeper understanding of gene regulation could show how some 
CODIS alleles actually do alter levels of gene activity so as to cause a disease.  
In fact, a few STRs in the introns of genes307 have been shown to regulate 
splicing and hence to alter mRNA transcripts.308  Only one of these is a 
CODIS locus (TH01), and efforts to associate the lengths of the TH01 STRs 
with diseases have produced inconsistent results and no useful disease 
predictions.  Some researchers report no associations with any alleles in the 
TH01 STR locus.  Some report positive associations with one allele.  Some 
report negative associations with one allele.  No two sets of researchers 
report associations with the same alleles.309  Still, future discoveries about 
 
amount of private information about you, including familial relationships, medical 
history, predisposition for disease, and possibly even behavioral tendencies and sexual 
orientation.” (internal citations omitted)).  
305 Natalie Ram, Fortuity and Forensic Familial Identification, 63 STAN. L. REV. 751, 759–60 
(2011) (hypothesizing, with no analysis, that the CODIS STRs could be regulatory). 
306 BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 63 (1912) (“[M]ore refined views as 
to the uniformity of nature would have been useful to the chicken.”). 
307 At least five CODIS loci reside in introns. 
308 By altering splicing, an STR locus could influence levels of output or relative amounts of 
alternative forms of a transcript.  See Scientists’ Brief, supra note 275, at 20; see also Joshua 
D. Groman et al., Variation in a Repeat Sequence Determines Whether a Common Variant of the 
Cystic Fibrosis Transmembrane Conductance Regulator Gene Is Pathogenic or Benign, 74 AM. J. 
HUM. GENETICS 176, 179 (2004) (relating variable penetrance of a TTTTT sequence in 
intron 8 of the CFTR gene to longer (12 or 13 as opposed to 11) adjacent TG repeats; 
however, given that the disease phenotype requires a severe mutation on the other CFTR 
gene, even if the TG STR were among the CODIS alleles, a database record could not be 
used to predict the presence of the genetic disease).  CODIS loci also might cause disease 
if they are transcribed to a kind of noncoding RNA that affects the quantity of a protein 
expressed in a cell.  No such transcription has been observed.  Scientists’ Brief, supra, at 
19. 
309 See E. Burgert et al., No Association Between the Tyrosine Hydroxylase Microsatellite Marker 
HUMTH01 and Schizophrenia or Bipolar I Disorder, 8 PSYCHIATRIC GENETICS 45 (1998) 
(finding no statistically significant association with the 10-repeat allele in a French sample 
from Alsace); Renata Jacewicz et al., Association of the Tyrosine Hydroxylase Gene Polymorphism 
with Schizophrenia in the Population of Central Poland, 42 PSYCHIATRIA POLSKA 583 (2008) 
(tentatively reporting a minor positive association with the 7-repeat allele and a minor 
negative one with the 9.3-repeat allele); Erik G. Jönnsson et al., Failure to Replicate an 
Association Between a Rare Allele of a Tyrosine Hydroxylase Gene Microsatellite and Schizophrenia, 
248 EUR. ARCH. PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 61, 62 (1998) (“[A] significant 
difference in overall tyrosine hydroxylase allele distribution was found between psychotic 
patients and control subjects.”); A. Kurumaji et al., An Association of the Polymorphic Repeat 
of Tetranucleotide (TCAT) in the First Intron of the Human Tyrosine Hydroxylase Gene with 
Schizophrenia in a Japanese Sample, 108 J. NEURAL TRANSM. 489, 491 (2001) (discovering no 
statistically significant associations for males in a Japanese sample and reduced incidence 
of the (6, 9) type in females); Rolando Meloni et al., A Rare Allele of a Microsatellite Located 
in the Tyrosine Hydroxylase Gene Found in Schizophrenic Patients, 318 COMPTES RENDU DE 
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STRs, together with more refined diagnostic classifications based on 
molecular methods, might lead to clinically meaningful predictions or 
diagnoses.  Certainly, the previous decades of failure to find consistent 
associations between CODIS loci and disease status are not a logically 
conclusive argument. 
It should be equally clear, however, that decisions of constitutional (or 
legislative) magnitude should not be based on the impression that all DNA 
sequence data will prove to be biologically significant and clinically 
applicable.310  Contrary to impressions generated by “hyperbolic” media 
reports that 80% of the genome has been shown to be functional, no 
scientific publications state “that 100% or even 80% of the genome makes 
organs function, stimulates tissue growth, turns normal cells into cancerous 
ones, makes us tall or short, fat or skinny, gay or straight.”311  Furthermore, 
parts of the human genome could be replaced with a random sequence of 
DNA with no observable consequences.312  In addition, the lack of detectable 
selection pressure on the CODIS loci is reassuring.313  Finally, considering 
the interactions of multiple genes and environmental factors, it is a safe bet 
 
L’ACADÉMIE DES SCIENCES SÉRIE III 803, 806–07 (1995) (demonstrating that in French 
and Tunisian samples, a 10-repeat allele was seen in 5% and 9% of chronic schizophrenic 
patients, respectively, and in no unaffected control subjects). 
310 Neither should they be made on the basis of assurances that simply because CODIS STRs 
are intergenic, they contain absolutely no information about any and all traits.  That 
claim would be oversimplified.  See Kaye, supra note 296 and accompanying text. 
311 Scientists’ Brief, supra note 275, at 31.  On the sorry state of the science journalism, see, 
e.g., John Timmer, Most of What You Read Was Wrong:  How Press Releases Rewrote Scientific 
History, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 10, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/staff/2012/09/most-of-
what-you-read-was-wrong-how-press-releases-rewrote-scientific-history (last visited Dec. 16, 
2012). 
312 See Sean R. Eddy, The C-value Paradox, Junk DNA and ENCODE, 22 CURRENT BIOLOGY 
R898, R899 (2012).  In an affidavit, Professor Erin Murphy argued that there is a serious 
privacy issue with profiles because “[n]o serious scientists have argued, much less proven, 
for instance, that human beings could be reproduced without their ‘junk’ DNA without 
any consequences.”  Declaration of Erin Murphy in Support of Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief re: 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at ¶12, Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009) (No. C 09-4779 CRB) [hereinafter Declaration of Erin Murphy].  In fact, it has 
been shown that very complex organisms can reproduce with major chunks of noncoding 
DNA deleted.  Marcelo A. Nóbrega et al., Megabase Deletions of Gene Deserts Result in Viable 
Mice, 431 NATURE 988, 988 (2004).  Forty years ago, “serious scientists” knew that 
“centromeric heterochromatin which represents a long tandem repeat of a short 
untranscribable sequence can be lost or duplicated without deleterious consequences.”  
Susuno Ohno, So Much “Junk” DNA in Our Genome, 23 BROOKHAVEN SYMPOSIA IN BIOLOGY 
366, 367 (1972) (internal citations omitted).  Serious scientists do not ask whether all 
noncoding DNA can be deleted with no ill effects.  They ask “how much junk, how much 
func?”  Cristian I. Castillo-Davis, The Evolution of Noncoding DNA:  How Much Junk, How 
Much Func?, 21 TRENDS IN GENETICS 533, 533 (2005). 
313 See Scientists’ Brief, supra note 275, at 17. 
Apr. 2013] ARRESTEE DNA 1151 
 
that no one will be able to deduce sexual orientation from either a 
fingerprint pattern or a CODIS profile. 
4.  What Is the Question? 
The Scientists’ Brief in King describes debates over the percentage of the 
genome that is “junk” and how much evolutionary “treasure” may be buried 
in intergenic regions as beguiling to biologists but “orthogonal” to the legal 
issues.314  From a Fourth Amendment perspective, the important question is 
not whether there are any noncoding DNA sequences that do something 
interesting or that have evolutionary significance.  There are.315  The 
question is not whether there are other classes of STRs and still other types 
of DNA sequences that are known to regulate gene expression.  There are.316  
Moving to the relevant sequences—the CODIS loci used for identification—
the question is not whether these STRs are used to study the genetics of 
diseases or other traits.  They are.317  And, the question is not whether some 
traits are associated with the STRs.  Ordinary ABO blood groups and serum 
proteins—the forerunners of modern DNA methods of identification318—are 
phenotypes, and a local database of these phenotypes would not be 
 
314 Id. at 26. 
315 See, e.g., Ryan D. Walters et al., InvAluable Junk:  The Cellular Impact and Function of Alu and 
B2 RNAs, 61 INT’L UNION BIOCHEMISTRY & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY LIFE 831, 831 (2009). 
316 As previously noted, DNA sequences are transcribed to various noncoding RNAs.  The 
line of research has generated considerable excitement.  See Alex S. Flynt & Eric C. Lai, 
Biological Principles of MicroRNA-mediated Regulation:  Shared Themes Amid Diversity, 9 NATURE 
REV. GENETICS 831, 831 (2008) (“[S]ubsequent explosion of miRNA research in the 
current decade has yielded breathtaking advances in our understanding of the 
mechanism and biology of miRNA control”); Helge Grosshans & Witold Filipowicz, 
Molecular Biology:  The Expanding World of Small RNAs, 451 NATURE 414, 414 (2008) 
(“[N]ew classes of small RNAs continue to be discovered”); John S. Mattick, RNA 
Regulation:  A New Genetics?, 5 NATURE REV. GENETICS 316, 317 (2004) (“This framework 
might allow us to understand the true basis of the evolution and development 
programming of complex organisms, and the basis of individual and species diversity.”); 
Tim R. Mercer et al., Long Non-coding RNAs:  Insights into Functions, 10 NATURE REV. 
GENETICS 155, 155 (2009) (“[T]he discovery of new classes of regulatory non-coding 
RNAs . . . suggests that RNA has continued to evolve and expand alongside proteins and 
DNA.”). 
317 E.g., Dongfeng Gu et al., Evidence of Multiple Causal Sites Affecting Weight in the IGF2-INS-TH 
Region of Human Chromosome 11, 110 HUMAN GENETICS 173 (2002) (using TH01 and other 
markers to study the relationship of a gene complex to obesity and height); Simona Neri, 
Mismatch Repair System and Aging:  Microsatellite Instability in Peripheral Blood Cells From 
Differently Aged Participants, 60A J. GERONTOLOGY:  BIOLOGICAL SCI. 285 (2005) (studying 
differences in the frequencies of STR alleles at five loci by age). 
318 See KAYE, supra note 275, at 6–7. 
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objectionable merely because it catalogues an expressed (rather than a 
predicted) physical or chemical trait.319 
The important question about the profiles recorded in a DNA database 
is the actual risk that the STR length polymorphisms will become more than 
marginally invasive of the informational privacy of an arrestee.320  The 
records are effective for their intended use of identification, but will they 
have adverse side effects on constitutionally protected privacy?  The 
Scientists’ Brief observes that 
even if some length differences of some of these STRs prevented or 
increased transcription of regulatory RNAs, it would not necessarily 
follow that they are “essential biological instructions for growth and 
survival of an organism,” and therefore “sensitive and private.”  They 
might have no effect at all because there are alternative paths to the same 
outcomes, or the affected traits might be no more significant than, say, 
the thickness of the eyebrows or the width of the nose.  One must ask 
whether the length variations of the particular STRs actually convey 
meaningful information, and they seem to contain less trait-related 
information than a photograph of an arrestee.321 
If this is correct, the CODIS profiles contain the same kind of information as 
dermal fingerprints. 
Yet, there is one clear difference between CODIS profiles and other 
biometric identifiers.  The STRs, like the rest of the genome, are inherited 
according to Mendel’s laws.  An arrestee’s profile could be compared with 
those of a putative mother and father to test whether the arrestee is their 
biological child.  In addition, pairs of profiles in the database could be 
examined to see if two people might be related in a few ways (as parent and 
child or as siblings).  Although such kinship testing in a large database 
would be inaccurate—it would miss many true relationships and would 
include many false ones322—it probably works better than drawing inferences 
 
319 Laws like Rhode Island’s, which forbids the use of “DNA samples for purposes of 
obtaining information about “physical characteristics,” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.5-10(5) 
(2010), are overly restrictive. 
320 Cf. United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d, 1213 1230 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010) (Lucero, J., concurring) 
(pointing out that the critical inquiry about a CODIS profile is whether it “categorically 
differs from the information already contained in the booking photo lineups on the 
bookshelf of virtually every police station in the country”). 
321 Scientists’ Brief, supra note 275, at 29–30; see also Mark Benecke, Coding or Non-coding?, 
That is the Question, 3 EUR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REP. 498, 500 (2002) (“[A]n old 
black-and-white mugshot . . . reveals a lot more about the person’s physical, social and 
maybe even mental state than the anonymous patterns in genetic fingerprints.”). 
322 James M. Curran & John S. Buckleton, Effectiveness of Familial Searches, 84 SCI. & JUST. 164 
(2008); Jianye Ge et al., Comparisons of Familial DNA Database Searching Policies, 56 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 1448 (2011); Steven P. Myers et al., Searching for First-Degree Familial 
Relationships in California’s Offender DNA Database:  Validation of a Likelihood Ratio-Based 
Approach, 5 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L:  GENETICS 493 (2011). 
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from the inherited parts of fingerprints.323  The fact that alleles are inherited 
implies that they supply (typically weak)324 information about genetic 
relationships between individuals in the database.  It also means that the 
profiles contain even noisier information about bio-geographic origins in 
that CODIS profiles are weakly correlated to ancestry325 and hence to socially 
perceived race or ethnicity.326 
These considerations undermine simplistic analogies between 
fingerprints and CODIS loci,327 but they do not make the noncoding, 
nonregulatory, nontranscribed, and nonconserved DNA identification loci 
highly toxic to personal privacy.  The profiles are not well suited to inferring 
bio-geographical history, let alone social race—and police would almost 
always have better, nongenetic information about the apparent race of an 
arrested individual.328  Certainly, the limited information that CODIS loci 
now supply does not begin to approach that of the hormones indicative of 
pregnancy or diabetes, which were part of the “host of private medical facts” 
that, together with “visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination,” 
prompted the Court to hold in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ 
Association329 that compulsory urine sampling interfered with reasonable 
expectations of privacy.  Like fingerprints and photographs, CODIS STR 
profiles should fall within the biometric exception. 
C.  DNA Samples 
DNA identification profiles represent a trivial fraction of the more than 
three billion base pairs in the human genome.  DNA samples contain the 
full genome, and in most database systems, the state retains these samples 
 
323 On the constitutionality of this practice as applied to partial matches between crime 
scene and database profiles, see David H. Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives:  A Constitutional 
Analysis of “Familial Searching”, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. No. 1 (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2043091. 
324 They could, of course, be used to test whether two profiles come from identical twins. 
325 Referring to a larger set of STR loci than the thirteen core CODIS loci, Richard S. 
Cooper et al., Race and Genomics, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1166, 1167 (2003), noted that 
The success of microsatellite loci in classifying persons according to continental 
group depends in part on the cumulative effect of minor differences in the 
frequencies of common alleles and in part on the effect of population-specific 
alleles.  In neither case is it apparent that such differences have relevance for traits 
that are important to health.  Most population-specific microsatellite alleles are 
unlikely to be functional; rather, like a last name, they merely help to verify the 
geographic origin of a person’s ancestry. 
326 See, e.g., Jennifer B. Listman et al., Identification of Population Substructure Among Jews Using 
STR Markers and Dependence on Reference Populations Included, 11 BMC GENETICS No. 48 
(2010), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1471-2156-11-48.pdf. 
327 See Kaye, Bury the Junk, supra note 298, at 80. 
328 Scientists’ Brief, supra note 275, at 36 n.27. 
329 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989). 
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even after it generates the profiles.  Impressed with the potential 
information in the entire genome, plaintiffs challenging California’s 
arrestee DNA law in Haskell v. Brown330 went beyond the “But it’s not junk!” 
response to the fingerprinting analogy.  They argued “that DNA is different 
because it is ‘something of mine which is very personal,’ ‘the building blocks 
of our existence,’ and implicates ‘our personhood’ . . . .”331  This vision of 
the genetic material as determinative of each person’s essential nature and 
fate pervades popular culture.  Influenced by metaphors of DNA as a “future 
diary”332 or “the entire blueprint for an individual’s life,”333 and of each 
chromosome as a “chapter in the book of life,”334 we have come to regard 
ourselves as puppets dancing on the strings of our DNA.335  The district 
court in Haskell found such expressions of genetic essentialism “emotionally 
stirring, but not legally compelling.”336 
A more measured argument about the information that could be 
extracted from DNA samples (as opposed to the identification profiles) 
relies on the correct premise that our genes (along with other things) have a 
great deal to do with a wide range of physical and mental traits.  To 
recognize the importance of genes in conjunction with internal and external 
environments is not to succumb to genetic determinism.  Some genes 
determine some traits almost regardless of the external environment.  Blood 
and tissue types, or fingerprint ridge counts, are examples.  Certain alleles at 
other single loci cause debilitating or fatal diseases in a wide range of 
environments.  That is why these rare diseases are called genetic.  Genes are 
involved in the metabolism of drugs, and some success has been achieved in 
tailoring drug prescriptions to individual genomes.337  Combinations of large 
numbers of genes, acting together in particular environments, influence 
susceptibility to common diseases and highly variable features such as 
 
330 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d sub nom., Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
331 Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
332 George J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks:  Protecting Coded ‘Future Diaries’, 270 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 2346, 2346 (1993). 
333 Declaration of Erin Murphy, supra note 312, ¶10. 
334 See Nicholas Wade, Life Is Pared to Basics; Complex Issues Arise, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at 
F3 (reporting the concern expressed by a medical ethicist that “when biologists 
sequenced the first human chromosome last month, they called it ‘the first chapter in the 
book of life, as if life is chromosomes’”). 
335 See generally DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE:  THE GENE AS A 
CULTURAL ICON (1995). 
336 Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1198. 
337 VOGEL AND MOTULSKY’S HUMAN GENETICS:  PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES 644 (Michael R. 
Speicher et al. eds., 4th ed. 2010). 
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height.338  These are polygenetic systems of quantitative trait loci that are far 
more difficult to elucidate than the simple Mendelian genetic disorders.339  
Thus, the “personalized medicine” promised by the Human Genome Project 
is progressing,340 but it has been slow to materialize.341 
The privacy implications—with respect to law enforcement DNA 
databanks—of our growing knowledge of genomics are not as clear cut as 
frenzied references to “over four thousand types of genetic conditions and 
diseases” and “genetic markers for traits including aggression, sexual 
orientation, substance addiction, and criminal tendencies”342 might suggest.  
Many of the diseases resulting from highly penetrant genes will have 
manifested themselves long before an arrest.  It is hard to imagine why 
database custodians would want to test DNA for such conditions, and “crime 
genes” never will be found.343  But in seeking to restore a sense of balance, I 
am also quibbling.  There is no doubt that the physical samples (as 
distinguished from the records in the databases) contain a “host of private 
medical facts.”344  Genetic tests could identify carriers of recessive diseases 
such as cystic fibrosis,345 sickle cell anemia,346 and Tay-Sachs disease.347  They 
can detect alleles that are protective or predisposing for presymptomatic 
 
338 See, e.g., Neil J. Risch, Searching for Genetic Determinants in the New Millennium, 405 NATURE 
847, 850 (2000) (“[N]umerous genes of smaller effect . . . are likely to underlie most 
common, familial traits and diseases in humans.”). 
339 Id. 
340 Margaret A. Hamburg & Francis S. Collins, The Path to Personalized Medicine, 363 NEW 
ENGL. J. MED. 301, 301 (2010) (“Researchers have discovered hundreds of genes that 
harbor variations contributing to human illness, identified genetic variability in patients’ 
responses to dozens of treatments, and begun to target the molecular causes of some 
diseases.  In addition, scientists are developing and using diagnostic tests based on 
genetics or other molecular mechanisms to better predict patients’ responses to targeted 
therapy.”). 
341 It could be that common diseases simply do not have common variants that can be 
detected in genome-wide association studies.  At the genetic level, every person’s 
predisposition to common diseases could relate to very rare alleles at various loci.  See 
VOGEL AND MOTULSKY’S HUMAN GENETICS, supra note 337, at 643; Nicholas Wade, A 
Dissenting Voice as the Genome Is Sifted to Fight Disease, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at F3. 
342 United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608 (W.D. Pa. 2009). 
343 See Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research, supra note 294, at 26869 (arguing that behavior is 
affected by many genes, each with limited effect). 
344 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989). 
345 See U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Cystic Fibrosis, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/cystic-fibrosis (last reviewed Aug. 2012) (explaining 
that cystic fibrosis is caused by a single, recessive gene, although other genes may 
exacerbate the problem). 
346 See U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Sickle Cell Disease, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/sickle-cell-disease (last visited Aug. 2012) (explaining 
that sickle cell disease is caused by a single, recessive gene). 
347 See U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Tay-Sachs Disease, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/tay-sachs-disease (last visited Oct. 2012) (explaining 
that Tay-Sachs disease is caused by a single, recessive gene). 
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individuals, such as those of the ApoE gene that is a risk factor in many cases 
of Alzheimer disease.348 
Whether the existence of such genetic tests defeats the application of the 
biometric exception should depend on an assessment of the incentives and 
disincentives for police to perform genetic tests at socially and medically 
significant loci.  (Indeed, valid privacy concerns are not limited to DNA 
tests, for a range of biomarkers in biological evidence and samples could be 
used in diagnostic testing for major diseases.)349  Existing database statutes 
limit the use of the samples to identifying the individuals whose DNA is 
recovered from crime scenes or victims.350  Thus, the government 
laboratories that generate identification profiles from arrestee samples are 
not equipped to test for the plethora of health-related loci; moreover, 
devices to automate the profiling—and that are incapable of analyzing other 
loci—are under development.351  However, a laboratory worker interested in 
the health status of an arrestee could smuggle a portion of the sample for 
testing at another laboratory, and inexpensive, portable devices for disease-
related loci also could become available in the future. 
But what would motivate police to undertake or facilitate surreptitious 
genetic testing at 4000 disease-related or other loci?  It is not as if there is a 
market for this information.  And, even if employers and insurance 
companies were anxious to use genetic testing in hiring or underwriting 
(notwithstanding state and federal laws enacted to prevent perceived or 
anticipated “genetic discrimination”),352 there are less dangerous ways to 
acquire information or samples than enlisting police officials in this illegal 
 
348 See U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Alzheimer Disease, GENETIC HOME REFERENCE, 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/alzheimer-disease (last reviewed Dec. 2008) 
(describing the ApoE gene as a risk factor for late-onset Alzheimer disease).  Indeed, 
“[p]eople carrying certain mutations in any of three genes—the presenilin genes PSEN1 
and PSEN2 and the gene for the amyloid-ȕ precursor protein APP—can be told with 
certainty that they will contract the disease (if they live long enough).”  David Cyranoski, 
Alzheimer’s Disease Genes Aid the Search for Preventive Drugs, NATURE, July 22, 2011, 
http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110722/full/news.2011.433.html. 
349 See, e.g., Susan Gaidos, A Spitting Image of Health:  How Saliva Can Help Doctors Diagnose 
Disease, SCI. NEWS, Nov. 19, 2011, at 26 (describing biomarkers in saliva for “diseases such 
as breast cancer, type 2 diabetes and Alzheimer’s”). 
350 Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research, supra note 294, at 275.  Existing database statutes permit 
certain forms of statistical research with anonymized profiles—not samples.  Id. at 
27576. 
351 See, e.g., Carmen R. Reedy et al., A Modular Microfluidic System for Deoxyribonucleic Acid 
Identification by Short Tandem Repeat Analysis, 687 ANALYTICA CHIMICA ACTA 150, 150 
(2011) (describing one such device that analyzes nine STR loci); see also supra note 202. 
352 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 295, at 55 (describing concerns expressed in Tania Simoncelli & 
Barry Steinhardt, California’s Proposition 69:  A Dangerous Precedent for Criminal DNA 
Databases, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 279, 288 (2005)); Mark A. Rothstein, GINA, the ADA, and 
Genetic Discrimination in Employment, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 837, 83738 (2008) (discussing 
federal protections against genetic discrimination and their shortcomings). 
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effort.353  Perhaps an individual officer or laboratory worker with a grudge 
against an arrestee would seek satisfaction by trying to acquire medically-
relevant genetic information, but such cases are likely to be quite rare.354 
Then too, there is the possibility that the law will change to allow the 
samples to be used for nefarious purposes.  Abuses that have been suggested 
include testing ancestry-informative loci “to round up individuals of a 
certain ethnic descent” for World War II style internment camps,355 
conducting research to identify genotypes associated with criminality,356 and 
expanding the databases to incorporate “genetic profiles for violence, 
aggression, or introversion and then focusing an investigation on those 
individuals whose profiles match that of the unknown suspect, as described 
by a witness or evidenced through a crime.”357 
Justice Holmes famously responded to the argument that the 
government might misuse the power to tax with the assurance that “[t]he 
power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.”358  Likewise, 
the Pool majority responded to the fears about “function creep”359 as follows: 
[B]eyond the fact that the DNA Act itself provides protections against 
such misuse, our job is limited to resolving the constitutionality of the 
program before us, as it is designed and as it has been implemented.  In 
our system of government, courts base decisions not on dramatic 
Hollywood fantasies . . . but on concretely particularized facts developed 
in the cauldron of the adversary process and reduced to an assessable 
record.  If . . . and when, some future program permits the parade of 
horribles the DNA Act’s opponents fear—unregulated disclosure of 
CODIS profiles to private parties, genetic discrimination, state-sponsored 
 
353 The Mitchell court paid particular attention to administrative and statutory “safeguards to 
prevent the improper use of DNA samples” and “the safeguards attendant to DNA 
collection and analysis.”  United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 399, 407 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(en banc). 
354 Cf. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004) (“we do not believe that an Edmond-type 
rule is needed to prevent an unreasonable proliferation of police checkpoints.  Practical 
considerations—namely, limited police resources and community hostility to related traff
ic tieups—seem likely to inhibit any such proliferation.”); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 
60102 (1977) (rejecting as speculative arguments about unauthorized disclosure of 
records of drug prescriptions in a law enforcement database maintained by the state 
department of health). 
355 Cole, supra note 295, at 55. 
356 See Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research, supra note 294, at 260 (collecting objections to 
research into “crime genes” and the like). 
357 John D. Biancamano, Arresting DNA:  The Evolving Nature of DNA Collection Statutes and 
Their Fourth Amendment Justifications, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 619, 622 n.10 (2009). 
358 Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928). 
359 Barbara Prainsack, Key Issues in DNA Profiling and Databasing:  Implications for Governance, in 
GENETIC SUSPECTS, supra note 3, at 15, 2832. 
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eugenics . . . —we have every confidence that courts will respond 
appropriately.360 
In short, if the motivation to scan an arrestee’s health-related and ancestry-
informative loci is slight, if the means to do so are not readily available, and 
if the mechanisms for detecting and punishing abuse are effective, then the 
retention of samples should not defeat the biometric exception for DNA 
databanks. 
Furthermore, comprehensive and indefinite sample retention is not 
essential to DNA databases.361  A laboratory can destroy the samples after 
generating the identifying profiles.  Eliminating the sample repository leaves 
a system that comes close to the collection and storage of fingerprint images.  
To be sure, some risk of diverting the DNA samples from arrestees would 
remain even though the samples are in the hands of the police for only a 
short interval.  No system is foolproof.  Thus, the analogy to fingerprinting, 
even with sample destruction, is not perfect.  But neither is it “pure folly.”362  
With no samples retained, DNA sampling on arrest should fall within the 
biometric exception described here. 
CONCLUSION 
The constitutionality of DNA sampling on arrest has divided the courts.  
This Article has traced the possible routes to a resolution of the issue.  These 
routes do not proceed in a simple, straight line.  The first fork in the road 
was whether to regard the procedure for acquiring information as a “search” 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  I did not explore this 
question deeply, but took the view that data acquisition triggers the 
Amendment’s protection.  On this assumption, the second fork was whether 
to move directly to a reasonableness balancing.  We saw that the Justices 
have been conflicted (or divided) on this, but the dominant mode of 
analysis remains classifying rather than balancing.  That is, the search is 
subject to the warrant requirement as modified by a finite number of 
categorical exceptions.  One of these exceptions, “special needs,” is unique 
because it entails balancing (at a programmatic level), but it is still part of 
the classificatory framework for analysis.  The third fork (assuming one 
 
360 United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. 
Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 83738 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (footnotes 
omitted)).  The Third Circuit sidestepped arguments about sample retention, stating that 
“to the extent that Mitchell submits that the potential future indefinite retention of his 
sample implicates privacy concerns, that issue is not before us now.”  United States v. 
Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 412 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
361 On the limited value of sample retention, see Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research, supra note 
294, at 27073. 
362 United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608 (W.D. Pa. 2009). 
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adheres to classifying rather than direct totality balancing), is eligibility for 
the special-needs balancing.  I argued that a biometric database used solely 
for criminal intelligence is ineligible.  If the database is used for both 
authentication and intelligence, however, I suggested that special-needs 
balancing ought to be available. 
But a court (especially the Supreme Court) need not take the second 
and third forks.  It should evaluate biometric databases under a hitherto 
unarticulated exception to the warrant requirement.  If such an exception 
applies, it circumvents all the problems we encountered:  the hazards in 
abandoning the warrant rule in favor of totality balancing; the ambiguity in 
determining whether the intelligence function is itself a special need; and 
the two-step shuffle if it is not.  The appropriate exception should permit 
warrantless acquisition and use of biometric data when the information is 
acquired with minimal impact on freedom of movement and bodily 
integrity, and is limited to establishing and authenticating an individual’s 
identity and to linking individuals to identifying marks or material from 
crime scenes. 
Fingerprinting more clearly falls within this exception than does DNA 
profiling.  But the difference is narrower than some courts have assumed 
(and wider than others have realized).  Both fingerprints and CODIS 
profiles might contain disease-related information, but to date, neither 
police, database administrators, insurers, nor employers can infer much of 
anything about the present and future health status of an arrestee from 
either a CODIS record or a fingerprint.  CODIS records could have more to 
say about relatedness and ancestry than do fingerprints, and retained DNA 
samples certainly are a rich source of information on all these matters.  
Thus, it may take greater effort to confine DNA acquisition and databasing 
to the authentication and criminal intelligence functions of biometric 
identifiers, but a properly administered system for establishing and trawling 
DNA databases should fall within this exception for biometric data. 
Recognizing a new exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment may seem radical.  However, the exceptions are not ancient 
specimens of an extinct species frozen in Devonian amber.  They are living 
creations whose structures continue to evolve and whose number is not 
fixed.  Although new exceptions are not created lightly,363 there are powerful 
crime-control and other law enforcement reasons for a state to maintain 
fingerprint and DNA databases for arrestees, the databases can be structured 
to respect most individual privacy interests, they can be administered fairly, 
and they can be accommodated with a specific and limited exception to the 
warrant requirement.  Consequently, it is neither heretical nor Quixotic to 
 
363 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 39091 (1978). 
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ask whether such an exception should be recognized.364  Like a brief stop 
and frisk, the acquisition of the biometric data is a lesser intrusion on Fourth 
Amendment interests than are ordinary searches of personal property and 
dwellings.  Therefore, the balance of interests that normally mandates 
probable cause and a warrant does not apply.  As in Terry v. Ohio,365 which 
allows less intrusive, warrantless searches on reasonable suspicion, a 
mechanical application of the Warrant Clause would not be appropriate.  
Indeed, when biometric data are useful purely for individual identification, 
the normal demand for a warrant pursuant to probable cause is not an 
integral part of the reasonableness that the Fourth Amendment requires. 
This conclusion simplifies the constitutional question.  With the 
biometric exception in place, the issue becomes whether a particular 
fingerprint or DNA database has sufficient protections to ensure that the 
samples and data are used strictly for identification.366  Although the wisdom 
of taking DNA before conviction is debatable,367 the practice is within the 
zone of permissible legislative experimentation.368 
 
364 Kaye, Arrest, supra note 7, at 49899. 
365 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
366 Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (upholding the constitutionality of a database and 
repository of prescriptions for certain dangerous drugs in which the state had (1) a 
“statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures,” id. at 605, (2) physical 
measures to ensure security, id. at 594, and (3) a history of operation that had not been 
marked by breaches of confidentiality, id. at 601 n.27). 
367 Whether a database that is limited to authentication and criminal intelligence gathering 
should include arrestees is a complex question.  This legislative issue involves not only the 
interests in crime-control and individual liberties, but also the costs of collecting and 
analyzing the additional samples and policing the system to reduce the risk of abuse.  In 
addition, it raises concerns about the disparate impact of DNA databases on racial and 
ethnic minorities who are overrepresented in the population of arrestees.  See Kaye, Arrest, 
supra note 7, at 508 n.231. 
368 Cf. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597 (“[I]ndividual States have broad latitude in experimenting 
with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern.”). 
